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  “Abhorred	  monster!	  	  Fiend	  that	  thou	  art!	  	  The	  tortures	  of	  hell	  are	  too	  mild	  a	  vengeance	  for	  thy	  crimes.	  	  Wretched	  devil!	  	  You	  reproach	  me	  with	  your	  creation;	  come	  on,	  then,	  that	  I	  may	  extinguish	  the	  spark	  which	  I	  so	  
negligently	  bestowed.”1	   Mary	  Shelley,	  Frankenstein	  I.	  	  	   INTRODUCTION	  I	   will	   argue	   for	   a	   fundamental	   reconceptualization	   of	   liability	   for	  copyright	   infringement.	   	   Specifically,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   essentially	  unchallenged	   orthodoxy	   that	   copyright	   infringement	   is	   a	   strict	   liability	  tort	  is	  false.	  	  From	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  on	  down,	  it	  does	  not	  even	  appear	  to	  be	   questioned	   that	   copyright	   infringement	   applies	   a	   strict	   liability	  standard.2	  	  Upon	  reflection,	  this	  is	  peculiar,	  given	  that	  this	  is	  anything	  but	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an	  innocuous	  doctrine.	  	  It	  is	  just	  the	  opposite;	  it	  is	  a	  doctrine	  that	  strongly	  favors	   copyright	   owners	   who	   may	   more	   easily	   prevail	   in	   infringement	  suits,	  as	  it	  will	  always	  be	  easier	  to	  establish	  strict	  liability	  as	  compared	  to	  fault	   liability.	   	   Fault	   liability	   is	   strict	   liability	   with	   one	   additional	  showing—not	   just	   that	   the	   defendant	   injured	   the	   plaintiff,	   but	   that	   the	  defendant	  injured	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  did	  so	  in	  a	  faulty	  manner.	  The	  lack	  of	  discussion	  is	  particularly	  puzzling	  in	  light	  of	  the	  pervasive	  view	   among	   copyright	   scholars	   that	   copyright	   law	   unduly	   favors	  copyright	   owners.	   	   Here	   is	   a	   fundamental	   rule	   that	   apparently	   favors	  owners	  and	  yet	  goes	  unquestioned	  by	  courts.	   	  Moreover,	   it	   is	  a	  peculiar	  rule	   that	   is	   out	   of	   step	   with	   modern	   tort	   law.	   	   Famously,	   there	   was	  historically	   a	   shift	   from	   strict	   liability	   to	   fault	   liability	   in	   tort.	   	   The	  transformational	  case	  most	  often	  cited	  is	  Brown	  v.	  Kendall.	  	  This	  naturally	  raises	   the	   question	   as	   to	   why	   this	   historical	   shift	   occurred	   in	   tort	  generally,	  but	  not	  in	  copyright.	  	  Why	  should	  copyright	  owners	  be	  favored	  in	   this	   manner	   when	   owners	   of	   physical	   goods	   are	   not?	   	   We	   are	  presented	   with	   a	   modern	   liability	   regime	   in	   which	   one	   can	   haul	  dangerous	  materials	   through	   a	  metropolitan	   area,	   such	   as	   Chicago,	   and	  be	   subject	   to	   a	   fault	   rule,	   but	   snap	   a	   photo	   of	   the	   label	   on	   a	   hazardous	  waste	  container	  and	  be	  strictly	   liable	   for	   large	  statutory	  damages.3	   	   It	   is	  hard	  to	  resist	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  strict	  liability	  rule	  is	  antiquated	  and	  out	  of	  step	  with	  modern	  tort	  law,	  which	  no	  longer	  supplies	  owners	  with	  the	  strongly	  favorable	  rule	  that	  is	  strict	  liability.	  	  Given	  this	  backdrop,	  my	  claim	   that	   indeed	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   the	   case	   that	   there	   is	   strict	   liability	   in	  copyright	   will	   not	   seem	   so	   strange.	   	   What	   is	   strange	   and	   in	   need	   of	  explanation,	   is	   the	   orthodox	   view	   that	   copyright	   infringement	   is	   strict	  liability.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine,	  the	   liability	   standard	   for	   infringement	   in	   copyright	   is	   now	   a	   fault	  standard.	  	  Closer	  scrutiny	  will	  show	  the	  orthodoxy	  to	  be	  an	  anachronism;	  however,	   once	   true	   but	   no	   longer	   so.	   	  My	   argument	   is	   not	   a	   normative	  one—that	  copyright	  infringement	  should	  employ	  a	  fault	  standard,	  but	  an	  analytic	  or	  interpretive	  one—that	  due	  to	  the	  important	  role	  played	  by	  the	  fair	   use	   doctrine,	   copyright	   infringement,	   properly	   understood,	   already	  
employs	  a	  fault	  standard.4	  
 DAME	   L.	   REV.	   47,	   52	   (1989)	   (“Liability	   for	   direct	   infringement	   is	   imposed	   on	   a	   strict	   liability	  basis.”).	  3. Ind.	  Harbor	  Belt	  R.R.	  Co.	  v.	  Am.	  Cyanamid	  Co.,	  916	  F.2d	  1174	  (7th	  Cir.	  1990).	  4. Elsewhere	   I	  have	  argued	  normatively	  against	   the	  application	  of	   strict	   liability	   in	   the	  context	  of	  non-­‐commercial	   creative	   content,	   arguing	   instead	   for	  a	   fault	   standard.	   	  See	   Steven	  Hetcher,	  The	  Kids	  Are	  Alright:	  Applying	  a	  Fault	  Liability	  Standard	  To	  Amateur	  Digital	  Remix,	  62	  FLA.	  L.	  REV.	  1275	  (2010).	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In	   this	   fundamental	   respect,	  U.S.	   copyright	   law	   is	   distinct	   both	   from	  that	  of	  civil	  law	  countries	  and	  other	  common	  law	  countries	  that	  have	  not	  adopted	   a	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   in	   copyright	   law.	   	   Fair	   use	   is	   sometimes	  compared	   to	   similar-­‐sounding	   doctrines	   of	   other	   countries’	   copyright	  regimes.5	   	   There	   is	   a	   crucial	   distinction;	   however,	  which	   is	   that	  notions	  such	   as	   fair	   dealing	   are	   well-­‐delineated,	   statutory	   carve-­‐outs.	   	   By	  contrast,	  a	   fair	  use	  defense	  may	  always	  be	   introduced	  under	  any	  factual	  circumstances.	   	   It	   is	  never	  dispositive	   to	  establish	   the	  elements	  of	   strict	  liability.	   	   This	   is	   only	   sufficient	   to	   make	   out	   the	   prima	   facie	   case	   of	  infringement.	   	   If	   the	  plaintiff	  has	  no	  colorable	   fair	  use	  defense	  and	   thus	  fails	  to	  prevail,	  it	  is	  not	  because	  the	  standard	  is	  strict	  liability,	  but	  because	  it	   is	   fault	   liability	  where	  the	  defendant	   is	  at	   fault,	   that	   is,	  not	  a	   fair	  user.	  	  What	  makes	  this	  appear	  not	  to	  be	  the	  case	  is	  that	  the	  defendant	  bears	  the	  burden	  with	  respect	  to	  establishing	  fair	  use.	  	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  fair	   use	   does	   not	   introduce	   a	   fault	   standard	   into	   what	   had	   been	   strict	  liability;	   it	   just	   means	   that,	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   fault	   standard	   in	   tort	  generally,	   defendants	   are	   less	  well	   situated,	   as	   they	   bear	   the	   burden	   of	  establishing	  a	  lack	  of	  fault	  on	  their	  part.	  	  However,	  in	  a	  typical	  tort	  suit	  it	  is	   the	   plaintiff	   who	   bears	   the	   burden	   to	   establish	   fault.	   	   This	   puts	  copyright	   defendants	   in	   a	   less	   favorable	   position	   than	   negligence	  defendants	  in	  other	  tort	  contexts,	  because	  it	  will	  be	  easier	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  infringement	  suits	   to	  make	  out	  a	  prima	   facie	   case	  and	   thus	   to	  prevail,	   if	  the	   defendant	   does	   not	   step	   forward	   to	   defend	  herself,	   or	   cannot	  make	  out	  her	  defense	  for	  reasons	  apart	  from	  the	  merits,	  such	  as	  an	  inability	  to	  
 5. See,	   e.g.,	   International	   Copyright	   Law	   and	   Practice:	   JAP-­‐45	   (Paul	   Edward	   Geller	   &	  Melville	   B.	   Nimmer	   eds.,	   1993)	   (“First,	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   provides	   various	   types	   of	   fair	   use	  which	   are	   exempt	   from	   copyright	   liability	   and	   legal	   licenses	   conditioned	   upon	   payment	   of	  compensation	  in	  Articles	  30	  to	  49,	  but	  makes	  clear	  that	  these	  provisions	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  moral	  rights	  of	  authors.”);	  	  Teruo	  Doi,	  Availability	  of	  the	  "Fair	  Use"	  Defense	  Under	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  Of	  
Japan:	   Legislative	   and	   Case	   Law	   Developments	   for	   Better	   Adapting	   it	   to	   the	   Digital/Network	  
Environment,	   57	   J.	  COPYRIGHT	  SOC’Y	  OF	  THE	  U.S.A.	  631,	  634–36	   (2010)	   (stating	   “In	  at	   least	   two	  copyright	  infringement	  actions	  filed	  with	  the	  Tokyo	  District	  Court	  and	  Nagoya	  District	  Court	  in	  1994	   and	   in	   2004	   respectively,	   the	   court	   denied	   the	   alleged	   infringer's	   defense	   of	   non-­‐infringement	   based	   on	   the	   ‘fair	   use’	   doctrine	   other	   than	   those	   instances	   of	   limitations	   and	  exceptions	  provided	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  .	  .	  .	  .	  In	  KK	  Gakushu	  Kenkyusha	  v.	  KK	  Daisan	  Shokan,	  .	  .	  .	  .	  the	  court	  held	  that,	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  sets	  forth,	  in	  Article	  30	  to	  Article	  49,	  various	  instances	  of	  limiting	  copyrights	  and	  conditions	   for	   such	   limitations	   in	  detail,	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  balancing	  the	  private	  rights	  of	  authors,	  etc.	  and	   the	  public	   interest	  of	  allowing	  other	  persons	   to	  exploit	  works	   of	   authorship	   in	   fair	   and	   equitable	   terms,	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   Act	   does	   not	   contain	   a	  general	  provision	  equivalent	  to	  the	  ‘fair	  use’	  doctrine	  with	  the	  legislative	  intention	  to	  provide	  limitations	  in	  instances	  provided	  in	  these	  provisions	  .	  .	  .	  .	  In	  JASRAC	  v.	  K.K.	  Tsuge,	  et	  al.,	  .	  .	  .	  .	  The	  Nagoya	  District	  Court	  held	  that,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  provided	  in	  Article	  1,	   and	   a	   set	   of	   provisions,	   beginning	   from	   Article	   30,	   to	   provide	   limitations	   on	   copyright	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  objective	  of	   the	  Act,	  under	   the	   legal	  system	  of	   Japan	   limitations	  must	  be	  expressly	  provided	  in	  the	  statute,	  and	  there	  should	  be	  no	  instances	  of	   fair	  use	  of	  works	  aside	  from	  such	  express	  statutory	  provisions.”).	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proffer	   relevant	   evidence	   due	   to	   financial	   inability.	   	   But	   the	   fact	   that	   a	  defendant	  could	   in	  principle	   rebut	  an	   infringement	  allegation	   through	  a	  showing	  of	  fair	  use	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  cause	  of	  action	  a	  fault	  based	  one.	  I	   will	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   an	   important	   policy	   implication	   of	   this	  doctrinal	  interpretation:	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  with	  regard	  to	  this	  fault	  standard	  should	  be	  shifted	  from	  defendant	  to	  plaintiff.	   	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  am	  proposing	   that	  alleging	  an	  absence	  of	   fair	  use,	   that	   is,	   an	  unfair	  use,	  should	   be	   added	   to	   the	   plaintiff’s	   prima	   facie	   cause	   of	   action	   for	  infringement.	   Courts	   are	   well	   placed	   to	   shift	   this	   burden	   so	   that	  legislative	   change	   is	   not	   necessary.	   	   If	   this	   policy	   proposal	   is	  implemented,	   two	   important	   legal	   consequences	   are	   likely	   to	   follow.	  	  First,	   shifting	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	  with	   regard	   to	   fair	   use	  will	   result	   in	  fewer	   instances	   of	   default	   judgments	   against	   defendants	   in	   copyright	  infringement	   suits.	   	   Second	   and	   correlatively,	   fewer	   infringement	   suits	  will	  be	  brought	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Before	  directly	  engaging	  in	  these	  main	  arguments,	   it	   will	   be	   helpful	   to	   first	   explore	   some	   general	   connections	  between	  tort	  and	  copyright.	  II.	  	  	   THE	  TORT	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  INFRINGEMENT	  Copyright	  infringement	  is	  a	  tort.6	  	  That	  is	  orthodoxy.7	  	  What	  precisely	  this	   means	   or	   entails	   is	   less	   often	   discussed.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   opposite	  position	  might	  appear	  more	  intuitive,	  namely	  that	  copyright	  infringement	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  a	  general	  carve-­‐out	  from	  the	  state	  common	  law	  of	  tort	  for	  those	  wrongs	  specified	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act.	  On	   this	   view,	   the	   dividing	   line	   between	   common	   law	   torts	   and	  
 6. Ted	  Browne	  Music	  Co.	   v.	  Fowler,	  290	  F.	  751,	  754	   (2d	  Cir.	  1923)	   (“Courts	  have	   long	  recognized	   that	   infringement	  of	  a	  copyright	   is	  a	   tort.”);	  Sw.	  Bell	  Tel.	  Co.	  v.	  Nationwide	   Indep.	  Directory	   Serv.,	   Inc.,	   371	   F.	   Supp.	   900,	   907	   (W.D.	   Ark.	   1974)	   (“Copyright	   infringement	   is	   a	  tort.”);	   Screen	   Gems-­‐Columbia	   Music,	   Inc.	   v.	   Mark-­‐Fi	   Records,	   Inc.,	   256	   F.	   Supp.	   399,	   403	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1966)	   (“Since	   infringement	   constitutes	   a	   tort,	   common	   law	  concepts	  of	   tort	   liability	  are	  relevant	  in	  fixing	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  statutory	  copyright	  remedy,	  and	  the	  basic	  common	  law	  doctrine	   that	   one	   who	   knowingly	   participates	   in	   or	   furthers	   a	   tortious	   act	   is	   jointly	   and	  severally	   liable	   with	   the	   prime	   tortfeasor	   is	   applicable	   in	   suits	   arising	   under	   the	   Copyright	  Act.”);	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana,	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  26,	  61	  (C.C.D.	  Mass.	  1869);	  Hetcher,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  1283	  n.35	  ("Courts	  have	   long	  recognized	  that	   infringement	  of	  a	  copyright	   is	  a	   tort,	  and	  all	  persons	  concerned	  therein	  are	  jointly	  and	  severally	  liable	  as	  such	  joint	  tort-­‐feasors.”).	  7. Given	   this	   fact,	   it	   is	   an	  oddity	   that	   torts	   casebooks—the	  main	  means	  by	  which	  new	  lawyers	  are	  taught	  tort—typically	  make	  no	  mention	  of	  IP	  torts	  such	  as	  copyright,	  trademark,	  or	  patent	  infringement.	  	  For	  example,	  Goldberg,	  Sebok,	  and	  Zipursky	  give	  the	  following	  examples	  of	   torts	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   their	   casebook:	   	   “[A]ssault,	   battery,	   conversion,	   defamation,	  defective	  product	  sales	  (products	   liability),	   false	   imprisonment,	   fraud,	   intentional	   infliction	  of	  emotional	  distress,	   intentional	   interference	  with	  contract	  or	  economic	  advantage,	   invasion	  of	  privacy,	  negligence,	  nuisance	  and	  trespass	  to	  land	  or	  chattel.”	   JOHN	  C.	  P.	  GOLDBERG	  ET	  AL.,	  TORT	  LAW:	  RESPONSIBILITIES	  AND	  REDRESS	  3	  (2d	  ed.	  2008).	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copyright	  infringement	  would	  be	  the	  preemption	  clause	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	   according	   to	   which	   there	   can	   be	   no	   common	   law	   torts	   that	   are	  duplicative	  of	  those	  wrongs	  specified	  in	  the	  Act.8	  	  Given	  the	  division,	  one	  might	  not	   think	   it	  unreasonable	   to	   inquire	  as	   to	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  even	  denominate	  the	  sort	  of	  wrongs	  specified	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Statute	  as	  torts.	  	  After	  all,	  is	  not	  judge-­‐made	  law	  often	  contrasted	  with	  statutory	  law	  as	  a	  distinctive	   species	  of	   a	   genus?9	   	  While	   this	   latter	   statement	   is	   true,	  upon	   closer	   inspection,	   it	  would	   appear	  not	   to	   gainsay	   the	   former	   legal	  proposition,	  namely,	   that	  not	  all	   torts	  are	  common	   law	  torts.	   	  There	  are	  common	   law	   torts	   and	   there	   are	   statutory	   torts.10	   	   To	   state	   the	   issue	  succinctly;	  why	  else	  call	  copyright	  infringement	  a	  tort	  unless	  it	  shares	  the	  features	  of	  a	  tort?	  11	  	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  are	  the	  common	  features	  of	   torts	  and	  are	   these	   features	  of	   the	  common	   law	  or	  statutory	  origin?	  	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  features	  does	  copyright	  infringement	  share	  with	  its	  sibling,	  torts,	  from	  the	  tangible	  world?	  III.	  	  	  FAIR	  USE	  AS	  A	  FAULT	  STANDARD	  As	  noted	  above,	  it	  is	  an	  orthodoxy	  to	  describe	  the	  liability	  standard	  in	  
 8. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  301(a)	  (2006).	  On	  and	  after	  January	  1,	  1978,	  all	  legal	  or	  equitable	  rights	  that	  are	  equivalent	  to	  any	  of	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  within	  the	  general	  scope	  of	  copyright	  as	  specified	  by	  section	  106	  in	  works	  of	   authorship	   that	   are	   fixed	   in	  a	   tangible	  medium	  of	   expression	  and	  come	  within	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  copyright	  as	  specified	  by	  sections	  102	  and	  103,	  whether	  created	  before	  or	  after	  that	  date	  and	  whether	  published	  or	  unpublished,	  are	  governed	  exclusively	   by	   this	   title.	   Thereafter,	   no	   person	   is	   entitled	   to	   any	   such	   right	   or	  equivalent	  right	  in	  any	  such	  work	  under	  the	  common	  law	  or	  statutes	  of	  any	  State.	  	  	  
Id.	   9. GOLDBERG	  ET	  AL.,	   supra	  note	  7,	  at	  12	  (stating	  “In	  most	  U.S.	   jurisdictions,	  torts	  such	  as	  negligence	  are	  common	  law	  causes	  of	  action.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  plaintiff’s	  ability	  to	  sue	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  she	  can	  obtain	  redress,	  are	  established	  by	  judicial	  decisions,	  rather	   than	   by	   a	   statute	   passed	   by	   a	   legislature	   and	   authorized	   by	   the	   chief	   executive.”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  10. Id.	  at	  14	  (“Tort	  law	  need	  not	  be	  judicial	  in	  origin.”);	  Taylor	  v.	  Meirick,	  712	  F.2d	  1112,	  1117	   (7th	   Cir.	   1983)	   (“This	   principle	   applies	   to	   a	   statutory	   tort	   such	   as	   copyright	  infringement”);	  Turton	  v.	  212	  F.2d	  354	  (6th	  Cir.	  1954)	  (“Rather,	   it	  has	  always	  been	  held	  that	  infringement	  of	  copyright,	  whether	  common	  law,	  or	  statutory,	  constitutes	  a	  tort.”);	  Glidden	  Co.	  v.	   Zdanok,	   370	   U.S.	   530,	   574	   (1962)	   (“[T]o	   determine	   the	   liability	   of	   the	   United	   States	   for	  patent	  or	  copyright	  infringement	  and	  for	  other	  specifically	  designated	  torts.”).	  11. See	  Caroline	  E.	   Johnson,	  A	  Cry	   for	  Help:	  An	  Argument	   for	  Abrogation	  of	   the	  Parent-­‐
Child	   Tort	   Immunity	   Doctrine	   in	   Child	   Abuse	   and	   Incest	   Cases,	   21	   FLA.	   ST.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   617,	   657	  (1993)	   (citing	   Streenz	  v.	   Streenz,	   471	  P.2d	  282,	   286	   (Ariz.	   1970)	   (McFarland,	   J.,	   dissenting))	  (“Nevertheless,	  Justice	  McFarland	  of	  the	  Arizona	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  it	  best	  in	  proclaiming,	   ‘a	  tort	   is	  a	   tort	   is	  a	   tort.’”);	   Jeffrey	  A.	  Van	  Detta,	  “Le	  Roi	  est	   	  Mort;	  Vive	  Le	  Roi!”:	  An	  Essay	  On	  the	  
Quiet	  Demise	  of	  McDonnell	  Douglas	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Every	  Title	  VII	  Case	  After	  Desert	  
Palace,	  Inc.	  v.	  Costa	  into	  a	  “Mixed-­‐Motives”	  Case,	  52	  DRAKE	  L.	  REV.	  71,	  81–82	  (2003)	  (“[A]	  tort	  is	  a	  tort—no	  matter	  how	  well	  the	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  branches	  may	  have	  sought	  to	  disguise	  its	  nature.”).	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copyright	   law	  as	  strict	   liability.	   	  Established	  copyright	  doctrine	  provides	  no	  significant	  allowance	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fault-­‐based	  liability	  standard.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  fault	  enters	  the	  picture	  in	  the	  orthodox	  view,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  distinction	   between	   “intentional	   infringement,”	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	  “innocent	   infringement,”	   on	   the	   other	   hand.12	   	   The	   distinction	   has	   an	  impact	  on	  the	  mitigation	  of	  damages	  but	  not	  on	  liability	  itself.13	  As	  will	  be	  seen	   in	   greater	   detail	   below,	   “innocent	   infringement”	   is	   a	   very	   limited	  fault	  principle.	  By	  contrast,	  tort	  law	  is	  uniformly	  conceived	  of	  as	  having	  three	  liability	  standards,	   as	   is	   witnessed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   tort	   casebooks	   are	   typically	  organized	  around	  the	  tripartite	  distinction	  of	  intentional	  torts,	  negligence	  or	   fault-­‐based	   torts,	   and	   strict	   liability	   torts.14	   	   Note	   that	   while	   tort	  orthodoxy	   views	   the	   tripartite	   liability	   standards	   as	   pivotal	   to	   the	  organization	   of	   tort	   law,	   this	   distinction	   is	   not	   essential	   to	   tort	   itself.	  	  Goldberg,	  Sebok,	  and	  Zipursky	  characterize	  a	  tort	  as	  follows:	  In	   sum,	   to	   commit	   a	   tort	   is	   to	   act	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   is	   wrongful	  toward	   and	   injurious	   to	   another.	   	   Torts	   in	   turn	   refers	   to	   the	  collection	   of	   recognized	   legal	   claims	   that	   enable	   a	   person	   (or	  entity)	   to	  obtain	  redress	   from	  another	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  he	  (or	  it)	  has	   suffered	   injury	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  been	  wronged	  by	   that	  other.	  	  Tort	  law	  consists	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  principles	  that	  determine	  right	  conduct,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  a	  victim	  can	   obtain	   redress,	   and	   the	   form	   that	   such	   redress	   may	   take.	  	  [T]ort	  law	  articulates	  legal	  responsibilities	  or	  duties	  that	  persons	  owe	   to	   one	   another	   and	   provides	   victims	   of	   conduct	   breaching	  
 12. Compare	  Bright	  Tunes	  Music	  Corp.	  v.	  Harrisongs	  Music,	  Ltd.,	  420	  F.	  Supp.	  177,	  180–81	  (S.D.N.Y.	  1976)	  (finding	  former	  Beatle	  George	  Harrison	  to	  be	  an	  innocent	  infringer	  when	  he	  unintentionally	   and	   unconsciously	   copied	   the	   tune	   of	   another	   song),	   and	   N.	   Music	   Corp.	   v.	  Pacemaker	  Music	  Co.,	  No.	  64	  Civ.	  1956,	  1965	  U.S.	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  6864,	  at	  *3	  (S.D.N.Y.	  Nov.	  5,	  1965)	  (“[I]f	   copying	   did	   in	   fact	   occur;	   it	   cannot	   be	   defended	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	   was	   done	  unconsciously	  and	  without	  intent	  to	  appropriate	  plaintiff's	  work.”),	  with	  Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer	  Studios	   Inc.	   v.	   Grokster,	   Ltd.	   545	   U.S.	   913,	   941	   (2005)	   (vacating	   summary	   judgment	   and	  remanding	   for	   further	   proceedings	   on	   whether	   defendants	   were	   liable	   for	   intentionally	  inducing	  infringement).	  13. New	   Line	   Cinema	   Corp.	   v.	   Russ	   Berrie	   &	   Co.,	   161	   F.	   Supp.	   2d	   293,	   300	   (S.D.N.Y.	  2001);	  see	  also	  David	  Hricik,	  Remedies	  of	  the	  Infringer:	  The	  Use	  by	  the	  Infringer	  of	  Implied	  and	  
Common	  Law	  Federal	  Rights,	  State	  Law	  Claims,	  and	  Contract	  to	  Shift	  Liability	  for	  Infringement	  of	  
Patents,	  Copyrights,	  and	  Trademarks,	  28	  TEX.	  TECH	  L.	  REV.	  1027,	  1087	  (1997)	  (“No	  scienter	  need	  be	   shown	   to	   prove	   infringement.	   	   Intent	   is	   relevant	   only	   to	   the	   decision	   whether	   or	   not	   to	  increase	   damages.	   	   A	   finding	   of	   willful	   infringement	   permits	   the	   court	   to	   increase	   statutory	  damages.	   	   Negligence	   or	   recklessness	   has	   no	   relevancy	   to	   determining	   whether	   copyright	  infringement	  has	  occurred.”).	  14. See,	  e.g.,	  MARC	  A.	  FRANKLIN	  &	  ROBERT	  L.	  RABIN,	  TORT	  LAW	  AND	  ALTERNATIVES:	  CASES	  AND	  MATERIALS,	  chs.	  II,	  VII,	  and	  XII	  (6th	  ed.	  1996).	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those	   duties	   with	   redress	   against	   those	   who	   have	   wronged	  them.15	  Note	   that	   this	   definition	   does	   not	  mention	   liability	   standards	   at	   all,	  much	   less	   whether	   there	   should	   be	   some	   specific	   number	   of	   them.	   	   If	  some	  particular	  doctrine	  with	  regard	  to	   the	  correct	  number	  and	  type	  of	  liability	  standards	  is	  not	  part	  of	  an	  exemplary	  definition	  of	  a	  tort,	  the	  fact	  that	   copyright	   infringement	  has	  a	  different	  number	   than	   torts	  generally	  would	  appear	  not	  to	  disqualify	  infringement	  as	  a	  tort.	  My	   dispute	   with	   the	   orthodoxy	   is	   not	   with	   regard	   to	   whether	   it	   is	  indeed	  accurate	  to	  understand	  copyright	  as	  containing	  a	  unified	  liability	  standard.	   	  My	  contention	  is	  that	  the	  unitary	  standard	  is	  a	  fault	  standard,	  not	   a	   strict	   liability	   standard.	   	   A	   strict	   liability	   tort	   requires	   mere	  causation:	  that	  the	  defendant	  caused	  a	  justiciable	  injury	  to	  the	  plaintiff.	  	  If	  causation	  is	  shown,	  intention	  or	  fault	  need	  not	  be	  shown.	  	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  saying	  that	   infringement	   is	  a	  strict	   liability	  tort,	  because	  the	  plaintiff	  need	   merely	   allege	   causation:	   namely,	   that	   the	   defendant	   caused	   a	  substantially	   similar	   copy	  of	  a	  protected	  work	  owned	  by	   the	  plaintiff	   to	  be	  made.	  Despite	   these	   doctrinal	   features	   of	   copyright,	   infringement	   is	   best	  understood	   as	   a	   fault	   standard	   because	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   not	   enough	   to	  establish	  causation	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  infringement,	  tout	  court.	  	  Rather,	  a	  plaintiff	  must	  establish	  causation	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  copy	  is	  not	   legally	   recognized	   as	   a	   fair	   use.16	   	   However,	   because	   fair	   use	   may	  potentially	   be	   interposed	   in	   any	   infringement	   dispute,	   it	   is	   always	   a	  contingent	   matter	   whether	   a	   showing	   of	   prima	   facie	   infringement	   is	  legally	   equivalent	   to	   actual	   infringement.	   	   This	   means	   that	   there	   are	  really	   only	   two	   kinds	   of	   potential	   infringement	   actions:	   those	   in	  which	  the	  use	  was	   fair,	  and	   those	   in	  which	   it	  was	  not.	   	   In	  either	  situation,	   it	   is	  fairness	  or	  fault	  that	  is	  dispositive—one	  consults	  the	  standard,	  and	  either	  determines	  that	  by	  its	  lights,	  the	  particular	  use	  is	  or	  is	  not	  fair,	  and	  thus,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  use	  is	  infringing.	  To	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   point,	   consider	   the	   fault	  standard	   in	   tort,	   generally	   speaking.	   	   It	   works	   by	   interposing	   a	   moral	  
 15. GOLDBERG	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  3.	  16. It	  might	   be	   retorted	   that,	  while	   this	   is	   true	   in	   theory,	   in	  practice	   the	  outcome	  will	  turn	   as	   well	   on	   unrelated	   and	   problematic	   factors	   such	   as	   the	   fact	   that	   large	   commercial	  entities	   are	   able	   to	   threaten	   and	   legally	   browbeat	   users	   into	   unfavorable	   default	   judgment	  outcomes,	   such	   that	   they	  are	  never	  allowed	   to	  vindicate	   the	   fair	  use	  status	  of	   their	  behavior.	  	  This	   is	   true	   and	   important,	   but	   a	   distinct	   issue	   and	   one	   that	   will	   receive	   attention	   below.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  will,	  in	  part,	  serve	  as	  a	  predicate	  for	  the	  policy	  argument	  developed	  below	  that	  favors	  shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  plaintiffs.	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test—fault—between	   the	  bare	   test	   of	   one	  party	   causally	   acting	   in	   some	  way	  that	   injures	  another,	  and	  a	  finding	  of	   liability.	   	  Fair	  use	  functions	  in	  precisely	   this	  manner	   to	   interpose	   a	  moral	   test—fair	   use—between	   an	  act	   by	   the	   defendant	   and	   its	   causal	   impact	   upon	   the	   plaintiff	   as	   being	  sufficient	   for	   liability.	   	   Just	   as	   one	   is	   not	   liable	   in	   a	   negligence	   or	  intentional	   tort	   claim,	   if	   one	   is	   not	   at	   fault	   in	   copyright,	   one	   is	   not	   an	  infringer	  if	  one’s	  act	  is	  fair.17	  	  A	  fair	  use	  is	  not	  an	  excused	  infringement,	  as	  plaintiffs	   sometimes	   claim,	   but	   rather	   a	   justified	   use,	   that	   is,	   not	   as	  infringement	  at	  all.18	  A	  fairness	  test	   is	  by	  definition	  a	  normative	  test.	   	  Fairness	   is	  not	  only	  an	  inherently	  normative	  concept,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  law.19	  	  This	  is	  prominently	  seen	  in	  John	  Rawls’	  famous	  phrase,	  “justice	  as	  fairness.”20	  	  It	   is	   in	   this	   simple	  way	   that	   the	   common	   law	  emergence	  of	   the	   fair	   use	  test	   adds	   an	   additional	   moral	   element	   to	   what	   was	   previously	   a	   strict	  liability	   test	   for	   causation,	   regardless	   of	   fault.	   	   The	   fair	   use	   test	   is	   best	  viewed	  as	  a	   species	  of	   the	  genus	   fault	   standard,	  as	   tort	   law	  offers	  other	  fault	  standards	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  whether	  an	  injurious	  act	  passes	  the	  Hand	  
 17. 17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107	  (2006)	  provides:	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   provisions	   of	   sections	   106	   and	   106A,	   the	   fair	   use	   of	   a	  copyrighted	  work,	   including	  such	  use	  by	  reproduction	   in	  copies	  or	  phonorecords	  or	  by	   any	   other	   means	   specified	   by	   that	   section,	   for	   purposes	   such	   as	   criticism,	  comment,	   news	   reporting,	   teaching	   (including	   multiple	   copies	   for	   classroom	   use),	  scholarship,	  or	  research,	  is	  not	  an	  infringement	  of	  copyright.	  
Id.;	  Gaylord	  v.	  United	  States,	  595	  F.3d	  1364,	  1385	  (Fed.	  Cir.	  2010)	  (stating	  “Clear	  error	  has	  not	  been	  shown	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Federal	  Claims'	  factual	  findings	  supporting	  the	  statutory	  factors	  of	  fair	   use.	   	   A	   transformative	  work	   is	   generally	   deemed	   a	   fair	   use	   of	   a	   copyrighted	  work.	   	   This	  finding	   of	   fair	   use	   of	   itself	   establishes	   the	   right	   of	   the	   United	   States	   to	   use	   a	   picture	   of	   the	  Memorial	   on	   a	   United	   States	   postage	   stamp,	   without	   liability	   for	   copyright	   infringement.”)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted);	  A.V.	  ex	  rel.	  Vanderhye	  v.	  iParadigms,	  LLC,	  562	  F.3d	  630,	  637	  (4th	  Cir.	  2009)	  (stating	  “Thus,	  the	  copyright	  owner's	  ‘monopoly	  .	  .	  .	  is	  limited	  and	  subject	  to	  a	  list	  of	  statutory	  exceptions,	  including	  the	  exception	  for	  fair	  use	  provided	  in	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107.’	  	  A	  person	  who	  makes	   fair	   use	   of	   a	   copyrighted	  work	   is	   not	   an	   infringer	   even	   if	   such	   use	   is	   otherwise	  inconsistent	  with	   the	   exclusive	   rights	   of	   the	   copyright	   owner.”)	   (internal	   citations	   omitted);	  Eldred	   v.	   Ashcroft,	   537	   U.S.	   186,	   219	   (2003);	   see	   also	   Sony	   Corp.	   of	   Am.	   v.	   Universal	   City	  Studios,	   Inc.	  464	  U.S.	  417,	  433	   (1984)	   (stating	   “Conversely,	  anyone	  who	   is	  authorized	  by	   the	  copyright	  owner	  to	  use	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  in	  a	  way	  specified	  in	  the	  statute	  or	  who	  makes	  a	  fair	  use	  of	  the	  work	  is	  not	  an	  infringer	  of	  the	  copyright	  with	  respect	  to	  such	  use.”).	  18. On	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  authorized	  by	  the	  law,	  see	  Lenz	  v.	  Universal	  Music	  Corp.,	  572	  F.	   Supp.	   2d	   1150,	   1154	   (N.D.	   Cal.	   2008)	   (stating	   “Here,	   the	   Court	   concludes	   that	   the	   plain	  meaning	  of	  ‘authorized	  by	  law’	  is	  unambiguous.	  	  An	  activity	  or	  behavior	  ‘authorized	  by	  law’	  is	  one	  permitted	  by	  law	  or	  not	  contrary	  to	  law.	  	  Though	  Congress	  did	  not	  expressly	  mention	  the	  fair	   use	   doctrine	   in	   the	   DMCA,	   the	   Copyright	   Act	   provides	   explicitly	   that	   ‘the	   fair	   use	   of	   a	  copyrighted	  work	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not	  an	  infringement	  of	  copyright.’”)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  19. Indeed,	   some	   justifications	   of	   the	   fault	   standard	   have	   been	   stated	   in	   terms	   of	  “fairness.”	   OLIVER	   WENDELL	   HOLMES,	   JR.,	   THE	   COMMON	   LAW	   77,	   110–13	   (Little,	   Brown	   and	  Company	  1909).	  20. JOHN	  RAWLS,	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  JUSTICE	  11	  (Harvard	  Univ.	  Press	  rev.	  ed.	  1999).	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Test,	  the	  Reasonable	  Person	  Standard,	  or	  the	  test	  for	  due	  care	  in	  the	  case	  of	  negligence	  torts;21	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dignitary	  torts,	  whether	  the	  act	  was	  intentional	  and	  lacked	  consent.22	  The	  moral	   intuition	   behind	   the	   fault	   standard	   generally	   is	   that	   it	   is	  unjust	  to	  hold	  someone	  liable	  for	  an	  injury	  that	  occurred	  through	  no	  fault	  of	   her	   own.	   	   So	   stated,	   this	   moral	   premise	   is	   broadly	   deontological	   in	  form.	   	   In	   this	   vein,	   Jules	   Coleman	   writes,	   “[i]n	   the	   received	   view,	   the	  substitution	   of	   fault	   for	   causation	   marked	   an	   abandonment	   of	   the	  immoral	   standard	   of	   strict	   liability	   under	   Trespass	   (which,	   after	   all,	  imposed	   liability	  without	  regard	  to	   fault)	   in	   favor	  of	  a	  moral	   foundation	  for	   tort	   liability	   based	   on	   the	   fault	   principle.”23	   	   However,	   a	  consequentialist	  approach	  may	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  result.	  	  Richard	  Posner	  writes,	   “Perhaps,	   then,	   the	   dominant	   function	   of	   the	   fault	   system	   is	   to	  
 21. United	  States	  v.	  Carroll	  Towing	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  159	  F.2d	  169,	  173	  (2nd	  Cir.	  1947)	  (“[I]f	  the	  probability	  be	  called	  P;	  the	  injury,	  L;	  and	  the	  burden,	  B;	  liability	  depends	  upon	  whether	  B	  is	  less	  than	  L	  multiplied	  by	  P:	  i.e.,	  whether	  B	  [is	  less	  than]	  PL.”);	  DAN	  B.	  DOBBS,	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  TORTS	  280	  (2000)	   (“The	   reasonable	   person	   whose	   standards	   the	   defendant	   must	   meet	   is	   said	   to	   have	  these	   attributes:	   (1)	   Normal	   intelligence;	   (2)	   normal	   perception,	   memory,	   and	   at	   least	   a	  minimum	  of	  standard	  knowledge;	  (3)	  all	  the	  additional	  intelligence,	  skill,	  or	  knowledge	  actually	  possessed	  by	  the	  individual	  actor;	  and	  (4)	  the	  physical	  attributes	  of	  the	  actor	  himself.”).	  22. See	  DOBBS,	   supra	   note	   21,	   at	   54	   (“The	   central	   core	   of	   the	   battery	   rules	   is	   simple.	  	  Subject	  only	  to	  the	  most	  limited	  exception,	  the	  defendant	  must	  respect	  the	  plaintiff’s	  apparent	  wishes	   to	   avoid	   intentional	   bodily	   contact.”);	   RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   TORTS:	   BATTERY:	  HARMFUL	  CONTACT	  §	  13	  (1965)	  (stating	  “An	  actor	  is	  subject	  to	  liability	  to	  another	  for	  battery	  if	  (a)	  he	  acts	  intending	  to	  cause	  a	  harmful	  or	  offensive	  contact	  with	  the	  person	  of	  the	  other	  or	  a	  third	  person,	  or	  an	   imminent	  apprehension	  of	  such	  a	  contact,	  and	  (b)	  a	  harmful	  contact	  with	  the	   person	   of	   the	   other	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   results.”);	   RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   TORTS:	  BATTERY:	   HARMFUL	   CONTACT	   §	  13	   cmt.	   (stating	   “In	   particular,	   the	   plaintiff's	   consent	   to	   the	  contact	  with	  his	  person	  will	  prevent	  the	  liability.	  The	  absence	  of	  such	  consent	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  those	  invasions	  of	  interests	  of	  personality	  which,	  at	  common	  law,	  were	  the	  subject	  of	   an	   action	   of	   trespass	   for	   battery,	   assault,	   or	   false	   imprisonment.”);	   Nelson	   v.	   Carroll,	   735	  A.2d	  1096,	  1100	   (Md.	  1999)	   (citing	  PROSSER	  &	  KEETON,	   THE	  LAW	  OF	  TORTS	  §	  8,	   at	  36	   (W.	  Page	  Keeton	  ed.,	  5th	  ed.	  1984))	  ("The	  intent	  with	  which	  tort	  liability	  is	  concerned	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  hostile	  intent,	  or	  a	  desire	  to	  do	  any	  harm.	  	  Rather	  it	  is	  an	  intent	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  result	  which	  will	   invade	   the	   interests	   of	   another	   in	   a	   way	   that	   the	   law	   forbids.").	   	   Jurisdictions	   differ	   on	  whether	  consent	  is	  properly	  a	  burden	  for	  plaintiffs	  or	  for	  defendants,	  although	  most	  appear	  to	  place	   the	   burden	   on	   the	   plaintiff	   and	   not	   the	   defendant.	   	   See	   6A	   CALIFORNIA	   JURISPRUDENCE:	  ASSAULTS:	  ASSAULT	  AND	  OTHER	  WILFUL	  TORTS	  3D	  §	  45	  (Robert	  F.	  Koets	  ed.,	  2003)	  (“Since	  lack	  of	  consent	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  assault	  and	  battery,	  the	  burden	  of	  proving	  lack	  of	  consent	  is	  on	   the	   plaintiff.”);	   ILLINOIS	   JURISPRUDENCE:	   PERSONAL	   INJURY	   AND	  TORTS	   §	  7:38	   (Krystal	   Shifflett	  ed.,	  2009)	  (“A	  plaintiff	  in	  an	  assault	  or	  battery	  action	  has	  the	  burden	  of	  proving	  every	  element	  of	   the	   cause	   of	   action,	   including	   the	   absence	   of	   consent.”);	   6	   AMERICAN	   JURISPRUDENCE	   2D:	  ASSAULT	  AND	  BATTERY	  §	  166	  (Marie	  K.	  Pesando	  &	  Liz	  Miller	  eds.,	  2008)	  (“While	  the	  plaintiff	  need	  not	  negate	  any	  affirmative	  defense,	  the	  plaintiff's	  burden	  is	  to	  prove	  lack	  of	  consent	  when	  it	  is	  an	   essential	   element	   of	   the	   claim.”).	   	   But	   see	   State	   Wash.	   v.	   Buzzell,	   200	   P.3d	   287,	   291–92	  (Wash.	  Ct.	  App.	  2009)	  (“Consent	  negates	  forcible	  compulsion;	  the	  burden	  to	  establish	  consent	  is	  on	  the	  defendant.”).	  23. Jules	  L.	  Coleman,	  Moral	  Theories	  of	  Torts:	  Their	  Scope	  and	  Limits:	  Part	  1,	  1	  L	  LAW	  &	  PHIL.	  371,	  374	  (1982).	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generate	   rules	   of	   liability	   that,	   if	   followed,	   will	   bring	   about,	   at	   least	  approximately,	   the	   efficient—the	   cost-­‐justified—level	   of	   accidents	   and	  safety.”24	  Moreover,	  within	  the	  category	  of	  deontological	  approaches	  there	  are	  variations.	   	   Most	   famously,	   in	   Palsgraf,	   Judge	   Cardozo	   espouses	   a	  reasonable	   foreseeability	   of	   injury	   standard	   as	   a	   moral	   prerequisite	   to	  liability,	  while	  Judge	  Andrews	  espouses	  a	  multi-­‐factor	  approach	  in	  which	  reasonable	  foreseeability	  may	  be	  a	  salient	  or	  even	  determinative	  factor	  in	  particular	   cases,	   but	   is	   not	   necessary	   for	   liability.25	   	   Contemporary	   tort	  theorists	  differ	  regarding	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  foreseeability	  requirement	  in	   tort,	  generally.26	   	  Recent	  case	   law	  has	  been	  divided	  as	  well.27	   	  Within	  the	   copyright	   doctrine,	   foreseeability	   has	   neither	   been	   an	   element	   of	  
prima	  facie	  infringement,	  nor	  an	  element	  of	  the	  four	  factor	  fair	  use	  test.28	  It	   is	   instructive	   to	   consider	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   fault	   standard	   in	  copyright	   in	   historical	   perspective.	   	   Consider	   first	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  fault	  standard	  arose	  in	  tort.	  	  This	  tripartite	  scheme	  of	  liability,	  set	  out	  above,	   replaced	   the	   ancient	   tort	   schema	   of	   the	   writs	   of	   trespass	   and	  trespass	   on	   the	   case.29	   	   Trespass	   torts	   required	   injurious	   actions	   that	  were	  direct	  and	  forcible.30	   	  Trespass	  on	  the	  case,	  which	  developed	  later,	  allowed	  trespass	  actions	  for	  injuries	  of	  which	  the	  cause	  was	  less	  forcible	  or	  direct.31	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  key	  to	  the	  ancient	  torts	  is	  that	  fault	  was	  not	   an	   element	   in	   the	   cause	  of	   action.32	   	   The	  directness	   and	   force	  of	   an	  
 24. See	  Richard	  A.	  Posner,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Negligence,	  1	  J.	  LEGAL	  STUD.	  29,	  32–33	  (1972).	  25. See	  generally	  Palsgraf	  v.	  Long	  Island	  R.	  Co.,	  162	  N.E.	  99	  (N.Y.	  1928).	  26. See	  John	  C.	  P.	  Goldberg	  &	  Benjamin	  C.	  Zipursky,	  The	  Moral	  of	  MacPherson,	  146	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	   1733,	  1812–24	   (1998);	  W.	   Johnathan	  Cardi,	   Purging	  Foreseeability:	   The	  New	  Vision	  of	  
Duty	   and	   Judicial	   Power	   in	   the	   Proposed	   Restatement	   (Third)	   of	   Torts,	   58	   VAND.	   L.	   REV.	   739	  (2005).	  27. See	  Cardi,	  supra	  note	  26.	  28. Recently,	   the	   foreseeability	   doctrine	   has	   been	   extended	   to	   copyright.	   	   See	  Shyamkrishna	   Balganesh,	   Foreseeability	   and	   Copyright	   Incentives,	   122	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   1569	  (2009).	  29. GOLDBERG	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  47.	  30. In	  the	  famous	  formulaic	  phrase	  from	  the	  old	  cases,	  acts	  of	  trespass	  were	  committed,	  “vi	   et	   armis,”	   that	   is,	  with	   force	   of	   arms.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   Rhodes	   v.	   Collins,	   150	   S.E.	   492,	   494	   (N.C.	  1929).	  31. DOBBS,	  supra	  note	  21,	  at	  25–26.	  	  The	  defendant	  throws	  a	  log	  in	  the	  plaintiff’s	  path	  and	  he	  trips	  over	  it	  after	  it	  has	  come	  to	   rest.	   A	   claim	   on	   those	   facts	   does	   not	   justify	   the	   use	   of	   the	   writ	   of	   trespass.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   claim	  might	   appeal	   to	   one’s	   sense	   of	   justice	   and	   in	   the	   late	   14th	  century	  the	  Chancellor	  began	  to	   issue	  writs	  to	  cover	  such	   indirect	   injuries.	  The	  new	  kind	  of	  writ	  was	  called	  trespass	  on	  the	  case.	  	  	  
Id.	   32. This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  fault-­‐based	  injuries	  could	  not	  be	  trespasses,	  however,	  just	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  fault	  but	  instead	  the	  force	  and	  directness	  that	  formally	  mattered.	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injurious	   act,	   per	   se,	   says	   nothing	   regarding	   whether	   the	   act	   was	   the	  result	   of	   faulty	   behavior.	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   ancient	   torts	   were	   strict	  liability	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  liability	  without	  fault—all	  that	  was	  required	  was	  causation	  of	  an	  injury	  by	  the	  tortfeasor	  to	  the	  victim,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  injury	  was	  sufficiently	  forcible	  and	  direct.33	  
 33. In	  modern	  tort	  generally,	  strict	  liability	  is	  the	  exception	  to	  the	  rule—it	  is	  applied	  to	  “unreasonably	   dangerous	   activities,”	   such	   as	   using	   explosives,	   or	   keeping	   wild	   animals.	  	  RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	  OF	  TORTS:	  ABNORMALLY	  DANGEROUS	  ACTIVITIES	  §	  520	   (1977)	   (stating	   “In	  determining	   whether	   an	   activity	   is	   abnormally	   dangerous,	   the	   following	   factors	   are	   to	   be	  considered:	  (a)	  existence	  of	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  risk	  of	  some	  harm	  to	  the	  person,	  land[,]	  or	  chattels	  of	  others;	  (b)	  likelihood	  that	  the	  harm	  that	  results	  from	  it	  will	  be	  great;	  (c)	  inability	  to	  eliminate	  the	  risk	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  reasonable	  care;	  (d)	  extent	   to	  which	  the	  activity	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  common	  usage;	  (e)	  inappropriateness	  of	  the	  activity	  to	  the	  place	  where	  it	  is	  carried	  on;	  and	  (f)	  extent	   to	   which	   its	   value	   to	   the	   community	   is	   outweighed	   by	   its	   dangerous	   attributes.”);	  RESTATEMENT	  (THIRD)	  OF	  TORTS:	  LIABILITY	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  AND	  EMOTIONAL	  HARM	  §	  20	  cmt.	  e	  (2010)	  (“Courts	   frequently	   state	   that	   blasting	   is	   a	   paradigm	   of	   an	   abnormally	   dangerous	   activity.”);	  
e.g.,	  Hargrove	  v.	  Billings	  &	  Garrett,	  Inc.,	  529	  S.E.2d	  693,	  694–95	  (N.C.	  App.	  2000)	  (“Blasting	  is	  recognized	  as	  an	  ultra-­‐hazardous	  activity	  in	  North	  Carolina	  and	  parties	  whose	  blasting	  causes	  injury	  are	  held	  strictly	  liable	  for	  damages,	  regardless	  of	  negligence.”);	  RESTATEMENT	  (SECOND)	  OF	  THE	   LAW:	   TORTS	   2D:	   LIABILITY	   OF	   POSSESSOR	   OF	   WILD	   ANIMAL	   §	  507	   (1977)	   (stating	   “(1)	   	   A	  possessor	  of	  a	  wild	  animal	  is	  subject	  to	  liability	  to	  another	  for	  harm	  done	  by	  the	  animal	  to	  the	  other,	  his	  person,	   land[,]	  or	  chattels,	  although	  the	  possessor	  has	  exercised	  the	  utmost	  care	  to	  confine	   the	   animal,	   or	   otherwise	   prevent	   it	   from	  doing	   harm.	   	   (2)	   This	   liability	   is	   limited	   to	  harm	   that	   results	   from	   a	   dangerous	   propensity	   that	   is	   characteristic	   of	   wild	   animals	   of	   the	  particular	   class,	   or	   of	   which	   the	   possessor	   knows	   or	   has	   reason	   to	   know.”);	   e.g.,	   Scorza	   v.	  Martinez,	  683	  So.	  2d	  1115,	  1117	  (Fla.	  Dist.	  Ct.	  App.	  1996)	  (“The	  owner,	  keeper,	  or	  possessor	  of	  a	  wild	  animal	  is	  strictly	  liable	  if	  the	  animal	  injures	  another.”).	  	   It	   is	   also	   applied	   in	   product	   liability	   cases.	   	   RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   TORTS:	   SPECIAL	  LIABILITY	  OF	  SELLER	  OF	  PRODUCT	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  HARM	  TO	  USER	  OR	  CONSUMER	  §	  402A	  (1965)	  (stating	  “(1)	  One	  who	  sells	  any	  product	  in	  a	  defective	  condition	  unreasonably	  dangerous	  to	  the	  user	  or	  consumer	   or	   to	   his	   property	   is	   subject	   to	   liability	   for	   physical	   harm	   thereby	   caused	   to	   the	  ultimate	   user	   or	   consumer,	   or	   to	   his	   property,	   if	   (a)	   the	   seller	   is	   engaged	   in	   the	   business	   of	  selling	  such	  a	  product,	  and	  (b)	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  and	  does	  reach	  the	  user	  or	  consumer	  without	  substantial	   change	   in	   the	   condition	   in	  which	   it	   is	   sold.	   	   (2)	  The	   rule	   stated	   in	  Subsection	   (1)	  applies	  although	  (a)	  the	  seller	  has	  exercised	  all	  possible	  care	  in	  the	  preparation	  and	  sale	  of	  his	  product,	   and	   (b)	   the	  user	  or	   consumer	  has	  not	  bought	   the	  product	   from	  or	  entered	   into	  any	  contractual	   relation	   with	   the	   seller.”);	   RESTATEMENT	   (SECOND)	   OF	   TORTS:	   SPECIAL	   LIABILITY	   OF	  SELLER	  OF	  PRODUCT	  FOR	  PHYSICAL	  HARM	  TO	  USER	  OR	  CONSUMER	  §	  402A	  cmt.	  a	  (1965)	  (“The	  rule	  is	  one	  of	  strict	  liability,	  making	  the	  seller	  subject	  to	  liability	  to	  the	  user	  or	  consumer	  even	  though	  he	  has	  exercised	  all	  possible	  care	  in	  the	  preparation	  and	  sale	  of	  the	  product.”).	  	  	   Once	  one	  considers	  this	  list,	  it	  seems	  obvious	  that	  copyright	  infringement	  is	  nothing	  like	  these	   activities	   as	   it	   would	   seem	   far-­‐fetched	   to	   call	   copyright	   infringement	   unreasonably	  dangerous.	   	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  some	  infringement	  activities	  that	  are	  unreasonably	  dangerous,	  but	   clearly	  most	  are	  not.	   	   Just	  as	  other	   types	  of	  property	  may	  be	   injured	   in	  different	  ways—namely,	   a	  person	  can	  be	  hurt	  by	  dynamite,	   a	  punch	   in	   the	  nose,	  or	  a	  banana	  peel	   left	  on	   the	  floor,	  such	  that	  the	  first	  might	  be	  an	  unreasonably	  dangerous	  activity	  calling	  for	  the	  application	  of	   a	   strict	   liability	   standard,	   the	   second	  may	  be	  a	  purposeful	   injury	   calling	   for	   an	   intentional	  tort	  standard,	  and	  the	  third	  might	  be	  best	  seen	  as	  a	  negligent	  harm	  calling	  for	  a	  fault	  standard,	  so	   too,	   it	  makes	   sense	   to	   conceptualize	   copyrightable	   content	   as	   capable	   of	   being	   injured	   in	  different	  ways.	   	  Ironically,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  orthodox	  infringement	  standard	  is	  seen	  to	  be	   a	   strict	   liability	   standard,	   it	   is	   hardest	   to	   imagine	   how	   the	   requirement	   standard	   of	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The	   fault	   standard	   emerged	   in	   case	   law,	   perhaps	  most	   famously,	   in	  
Brown	   v.	   Kendall.	   	   There,	   the	   court	  wrote:	   “[W]hat	   constitutes	   ordinary	  care	  will	  vary	  with	  the	  circumstances	  of	  cases.	   	  In	  general,	   it	  means	  that	  the	  kind	  and	  degree	  of	  care,	  which	  prudent	  and	  cautious	  men	  would	  use,	  such	  as	  is	  required	  by	  the	  exigency	  of	  the	  case,	  and	  such	  as	  is	  necessary	  to	  guard	  against	  probable	  danger.”34	  My	   suggestion	   is	   that	   a	   parallel	   sort	   of	   historical	   shift	   in	   liability	  standards	  away	  from	  strict	  liability	  has	  occurred	  in	  copyright,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  tort	  generally.	   	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  general	  awareness	  of	  this	   shift	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   copyright	   infringement—the	   orthodox	  understanding	   has	   not	   caught	   up	  with	   the	   new	   reality	  marshaled	   in	   by	  the	  blossoming	  of	  fair	  use.35	  One	  feature	  of	   infringement	  adjudication	  that	  may	  make	  fair	  use	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  fault	  standard,	   is	  the	  procedural	  posture	  in	  which	  it	  arises,	  namely,	  as	  an	  affirmative	  defense.	  	  But	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  mean	  fair	  use	  is	  not	   a	   fault	   standard,	   but	   instead	   that	   it	   is	   one	   for	  which	   the	   burden	   of	  proof	  lies	  with	  defendants	  who	  carry	  the	  burden	  to	  establish	  lack	  of	  fault	  due	  to	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  copying.	  	  Doing	  so	  does	  not	  have	  the	  implication	  
 “unreasonably	  dangerous”	  behavior	  can	  be	  met;	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  one	  can	  use	  dynamite	  to	  blow	  up	  copyright-­‐protected	   works,	   as	   they	   are	   intangible,	   nor	   can	   such	   works	   be	   torn	   apart	   by	  domestically	  kept	  wild	  animals	   for	   the	  same	  reason.	   	  Nor	  can	  defective	  products	  easily	  harm	  copyrights;	  a	  defectively	  designed	  ski	  hill	  might	  lead	  to	  Sonny	  Bono’s	  demise,	  but	  his	  songs	  will	  live	  forever.	  	  If	  one	  is	  creative,	  one	  can	  come	  up	  with	  an	  example,	  such	  as	  a	  defective	  photocopy	  machine	   that,	   as	   a	   result,	   creates	   unauthorized	   copies.	   	   This	   hypothetical	   of	   infringement	  through	  a	  defective	  product	  is	  best	  viewed	  as	  the	  exception	  that	  proves	  the	  rule;	  however,	  for	  as	  a	  rule,	  infringements	  do	  not	  result	  from	  unreasonably	  dangerous	  behavior.	  34. Brown	  v.	  Kendall,	  60	  Mass.	  292,	  296	  (1850);	  see	  also	  Brown	  v.	  Collins,	  53	  N.H.	  442,	  451	  (1873)	  (rejecting	  strict	  liability	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  negligence	  rule);	  Losee	  v.	  Buchanan	  51	  N.Y.	  476,	  488	  (1873)	  (stating	  “No	  one	  in	  such	  case	  is	  made	  liable	  without	  some	  fault	  or	  negligence	  on	  his	  part,	  however	  serious	  the	  injury	  may	  be	  which	  he	  may	  accidentally	  cause;	  and	  there	  can	  be	  no	  reason	  for	  holding	  one	  liable	  for	  accidental	  injuries	  to	  property	  when	  he	  is	  exempt	  from	  liability	  for	  such	  injuries	  to	  the	  person.”);	  see	  also	  Ind.	  Harbor	  Belt	  R.R.	  Co.	  v.	  Am.	  Cyanamid	  Co.,	  916	  F.2d	  1174,	  1177	  (7th	  Cir.	  1990)	  (holding	  that	  strict	  liability	  is	  only	  imposed	  when	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  an	  activity	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  through	  due	  care).	  	  LAWRENCE	  M.	  FRIEDMAN,	  A	  HISTORY	  OF	  AMERICAN	  LAW	  350	  (3d	  ed.	  2005)	  (“The	  old	  common	  law	  had	  very	  little	  to	  say	  about	  personal	  injuries	  caused	  by	  careless	  behavior.	  	  A	  good	  many	  basic	  doctrines	  of	  tort	  law	  first	  appeared	  before	  1850;	  but	  it	  was	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  that	  this	  area	  of	  law	  (and	  life)	  experienced	  its	  biggest	  spurt	  of	  growth.”).	  35. Indeed,	   from	   its	  humble	  beginnings	   in	  case	   law	   from	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century,	   fault	  has	  passed	  from	  being	  the	  upstart,	  to	  being	  the	  ascendant	  liability	  principle,	  to	  arguably	  being	  the	   leading	   one	   currently.	   	   This	   leap	   to	   predominance	   can	   be	   seen,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	  organization	   of	   a	   more	   recent	   and	   more	   theoretically-­‐oriented	   casebook	   such	   as	   the	   one	  authored	   by	   Goldberg,	   Sebok,	   and	   Zipursky,	   which	   begins	   with	   fault	   liability,	   in	   contrast	   to	  established	  tradition	  whereby	  torts	  casebooks	  started	  with	  the	  intentional	  torts.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  fault	  has	  come	  to	  assume	  this	  pivotal	  role	  in	  tort	  generally,	  but	  barely	  appears	  to	  merit	  mention	  in	  copyright	  doctrine,	  cannot	  but	  cause	  any	  copyright	  theorist	  to,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  seek	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  this	  odd	  state	  of	  affairs	  came	  to	  pass.	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that	  these	  are	  no	  longer	  fault	  liability	  cases;	  however,	  it	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	   fact	   that	   courts	   that	   shift	   evidentiary	   burdens	   in	   other	   sorts	   of	   tort	  cases	   do	   not,	   in	   consequence,	   shift	   liability	   standards.	   	   As	   will	   be	  discussed	   in	  greater	  detail	   in	   the	  next	  section,	   in	   tort,	   courts	  sometimes	  shift	   some	  burdens	   onto	   the	   defendant,	   including	   the	   burden	   regarding	  fault.36	  One	   of	   the	   distinctive	   features	   of	   fair	   use	   is	   that	   while	   Congress	  codified	  the	  doctrine	  in	  the	  ‘76	  Act,	  it	  went	  out	  of	  its	  way	  to	  note	  that,	  in	  doing	   so,	   it	   did	   not	   mean	   to	   freeze	   the	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   from	   further	  evolution	   as	   a	   result	   of	   judicial	   interpretation.37	   This	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  invitation	  to	  courts	   to	  expand	  or	  curtail	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  when	  they	  deem	   it	   appropriate	   to	   do	   so.	   	   Indeed,	   courts	   often	   quote	   the	   statutory	  history	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  court	  with	  greater	  latitude	  with	   regard	   to	   fair	   use.38	   	   This	   explicit	   invitation	   to	   courts	   to	   continue	  adapting	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine	   is	  an	  unusual	  provision	   in	  a	   statute.	   	   It	   is	  worth	   highlighting	   that	   fact	   in	   the	   present	   context,	   because	   the	   policy	  prescription	  that	   I	  endorse	  comes	  within	  the	  doctrinal	  penumbra	  of	   fair	  use—which	   party	   has	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   with	   regard	   to	   its	  establishment—and	  thus,	  I	  claim,	  is	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  Congress’s	  invitation	  to	  innovate.39	  	  Consider	  next	  the	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  burden-­‐shifting	  
 36. See	  Summers	  v.	  Tice,	  199	  P.2d	  1,	  33	  (Cal.	  1948)	  (shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  the	  defendants	  who	  needed	  to	  show	  which	  of	  them	  caused	  the	  harm);	  see	  also	  Byrne	  v.	  Boadle,	  159	  Eng.	  Rep.	  299,	  300	  (1865)	  (where	  res	  ipsa	  loquitur	  shifts	  the	  burden	  to	  the	  defendant	  to	  prove	  that	   the	   injury	   would	   have	   otherwise	   occurred	   in	   some	   manner	   other	   than	   through	   his	  negligence.).	  	  37. Copyright	   Act	   of	   1976,	   Pub.	   L.	   No.	   94-­‐553,	   §	  107,	   90	   Stat.	   2541,	   2546	   (codified	   as	  amended	  at	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107	  (2006));	  see	  Campbell	  v.	  Acuff-­‐Rose	  Music,	  Inc.,	  510	  U.S.	  569,	  576–78	  (1994).	  	  In	  his	  hornbook,	  Marshall	  Leaffer	  states:	  	  The	  doctrine	  of	   fair	  use	   is	   codified	   in	   §	  107	  of	   the	  1976	  Act.	   	   The	   statute,	   however,	  does	   not	   provide	   a	   tight	   definition	   of	   the	   doctrine.	   	   Instead,	   it	   sets	   forth	   in	   its	  preamble	  the	  kinds	  of	  uses	  that	  usually	  prompt	  the	  defense,	  followed	  by	  four	  criteria	  that	  must	  all	  be	  applied	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  defense	  succeeds.	   	  The	  legislative	  history	   of	   §	  107	   indicates	   no	   intent	   to	   freeze	   the	   doctrine,	   but	   rather	   to	   allow	   its	  continuing	   development	   through	   the	   case	   law	   and	   its	   adaptation	   to	   changing	   times	  and	  technology.	  MARSHALL	  LEAFFER,	  UNDERSTANDING	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW	  429	  (Matthew	  Bender	  &	  Co.,	  Inc.	  eds.,	  3d	  ed.	  1999)	  (citing	  H.R.	  REP.	  NO.	  94-­‐1476,	  at	  66	  at	  (1976)).	  	  38. See,	   e.g.,	   Atari	   Games	   Corp.	   v.	   Nintendo	   of	   Am.,	   Inc.,	   975	   F.2d	   832,	   843	   (Fed.	   Cir.	  1992)	   (“The	   legislative	   history	   of	   section	   107	   suggests	   that	   courts	   should	   adapt	   the	   fair	   use	  exception	  to	  accommodate	  new	  technological	  innovations.”).	  39. There	   is	   precedent	  with	   regard	   to	   secondary	   liability.	   	  See	   Craig	  A.	   Grossman,	  The	  
Evolutionary	   Drift	   of	   Vicarious	   Liability	   and	   Contributory	   Infringement:	   From	   Interstitial	   Gap	  
Filler	   to	   Arbiter	   of	   the	   Content	   Wars,	   58	   SMU	   L.	   REV.	   357	   (2005);	   	   Peter	   S.	   Menell	   &	   David	  Nimmer,	   Unwinding	   Sony,	   95	   CALIF.	   L.	   REV.	   941,	   993	   (2007)	   (“The	   question	   of	   secondary	  liability	  fits	   into	  its	  own	  niche	  in	  the	  law,	  which	  the	  legislative	  history	  specifically	  declined	  to	  alter	  from	  established	  case	  law.”).	   	  See	  also	  Peter	  S.	  Menell	  &	  David	  Nimmer,	  Legal	  Realism	  in	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proposal.	   IV.	  	  	  SHIFTING	  THE	  BURDEN	  OF	  PROOF	  My	  initial	  argument	  for	  shifting	  the	  burden	  with	  regard	  to	  fault	  onto	  plaintiffs	   is	   simple:	   if	   one	   buys	   the	   argument	   that	   fair	   use	   introduces	   a	  fault	  standard	   into	  copyright,	   then	  other	  things	  equal	  (and	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   there	   is	  a	  unity	  to	  tort),	  one	  should	  expect	   that	   the	  same	  burden	  of	  proof	  should	  prevail	  in	  copytort,	  if	  you	  will,	  as	  in	  tort	  generally.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  in	  tort	  plaintiffs	  must	  allege	  fault,	  why	  not	  in	  copytort	  as	  well?	  40	  As	  noted	  above,	   currently,	   copyright	   infringement	  plaintiffs	   are	   able	  to	  establish	  a	  prima	  facie	  cause	  of	  action	  simply	  by	  establishing	  copying	  and	   substantial	   similarity	   of	   protected	   expression.41	   	   Note	   that	   such	   a	  showing	  goes	  only	   to	  establishing	  causation,	  namely,	   that	   the	  defendant	  caused	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  protected	  expression	  to	  be	  made.	   	  This	  is	  strict	   liability.	   	   If	   the	  gravamen	  of	   an	  action	   for	   infringement	   is	   a	   rights	  violation,	   and	   a	   fair	   use	   is	   not	   a	   rights	   violation	   because	   it	   is	   not	   an	  infringement,42	   then	   it	   certainly	   would	   seem	   sensible	   to	   make	   it	   an	  
 
Action:	  Indirect	  Copyright	  Liability’s	  Continuing	  Tort	  Framework	  and	  Sony’s	  De	  Facto	  Demise,	  55	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  143,	  167,	  203	  (2007).	  Prior	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   Sony	   case,	   copyright	   law	   had	   already	   developed	   an	  elaborate	   jurisprudence	   for	   determining	   secondary	   liability.	   	   To	   prove	   vicarious	  liability,	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  defendant	  possesses	  (1)	  an	  obvious	  and	  direct	  financial	   interest	  in	  the	  exploitation	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  materials;	  and	  (2)	  the	   right	   and	   ability	   to	   supervise	   the	   infringing	   conduct.	   	   To	   prove	   contributory	  infringement,	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  defendant,	  with	  knowledge	  of	  the	   infringing	   activity,	   induced,	   caused,	   or	   materially	   contributed	   to	   the	   infringing	  conduct	   of	   another.	   	   The	   innovation	   of	   Sony,	   of	   course,	   was	   to	   depart	   from	   the	  framework	  by	  adopting	  patent	  law's	  staple	  article	  of	  commerce	  doctrine	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Although	  
Sony	   nominally	   crowned	   patent	   law’s	   staple	   article	   of	   commerce	   doctrine	   as	   the	  decisor	   for	   copyright	   cases,	   as	   a	   practical	   matter,	   the	   ancien[t]	   régime	   reigns	  sovereign.	  	  The	  inherent	  logic	  of	  the	  tort	  framework	  still	  dominates	  actual	  analysis,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  nominal	  fealty	  to	  Sony	  that	  courts	  outwardly	  profess.	  	  As	  shown	  above,	  various	   jurists	   have	   gravitated	   away	   from	   the	   Sony	   test	   and	   toward	   a	   tort-­‐based	  analysis	  over	  the	  years	  since	  the	  case	  was	  decided.	  	  	  
Id.	   40. Grenier	  v.	  Med.	  Eng’g	  Corp.	  243	  F.3d	  200,	  203	  (5th	  Cir.	  2001)	  (“Under	  Louisiana	  law,	  ‘A	   cause	   of	   action	   accrues	   when	   a	   plaintiff	   may	   bring	   a	   lawsuit.	   In	   a	   negligence	   action,	   for	  instance,	  the	  claimant	  must	  be	  able	  to	  allege	  fault,	  causation,	  and	  damages.’”)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted);	  Clark-­‐Aiken	  Co.	  v.	  Cromwell-­‐Right	  Co.,	  323	  N.E.2d	  876,	  877	  (Mass.	  1975).	  41. Feist	   Publ’n,	   Inc.	   v.	   Rural	   Tel.	   Serv.	   Co.,	   499	   U.S.	   340,	   361	   (1991)	   (“To	   establish	  infringement,	   two	   elements	   must	   be	   proven:	   (1)	   ownership	   of	   a	   valid	   copyright,	   and	   (2)	  copying	  of	  constituent	  elements	  of	  the	  work	  that	  are	  original.”);	  Bouchat	  v.	  Baltimore	  Ravens,	  Inc.,	  241	  F.3d	  350,	  353	  (4th	  Cir.	  2001)	  (“To	  prove	  copyright	  infringement,	  a	  plaintiff	  must	  show	  first	   that	  he	  owned	  the	  copyright	   to	   the	  work	  that	  was	  allegedly	  copied,	  and	  second,	   that	   the	  defendant	  copied	  protected	  elements	  of	  the	  work.”).	  42. See	   Sony	   Corp.	   of	   Am.	   v.	   Universal	   City	   Studios,	   Inc.,	   464	   U.S.	   417,	   433	   (1984)	  (“[A]nyone	  who	  .	  .	  .	  makes	  a	  fair	  use	  of	  the	  work	  is	  not	  an	  infringer	  of	  the	  copyright	  with	  respect	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element	   of	   an	   infringement	   action	   that	   the	   allegedly	   infringing	   act	   was	  not	  a	  fair	  use;	  that	  is,	  a	  rights	  violation.	  Another	   way	   to	   look	   at	   the	   suggested	   proposal	   is	   to	   imagine	   how	  strange	  and	  unwelcome	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  put	  the	  burden	  on	  defendants,	  in	  tort	  suits	  generally,	   to	  establish	  an	  absence	  of	   fault	   instead	  of	  placing	  the	   burden	   on	   plaintiffs,	   as	   is	   currently	   done	   in	   all	   U.S.	   jurisdictions.	  	  Arguably,	   it	   once	   may	   have	   made	   sense	   for	   the	   burden	   to	   rest	   with	  defendants	  in	  copyright.	  	  Fair	  use	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  case	  law	  and	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	   of	   common	   law	   processes	   is	   that	   value	   is	   placed	   on	  incremental	   change.43	   	   Early	   on,	   there	   was	   no	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   in	  copyright	  law.	  	  And	  when	  it	  appeared,	  the	  doctrine	  started	  life	  as	  a	  small	  limited	   exception	   to	   infringement.44	   	   The	   conventional	   starting	   point	   is	  
Folsom	   v.	  Marsh,	   although	   the	   opinion	   does	   not	   explicitly	  mention	   “fair	  use.”45	  	  The	  explicit	  test	  for	  “fair	  use”	  first	  appears	  in	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana.46	  	  From	   there,	   the	   doctrine	   evolved	   in	   case	   law	   for	   more	   than	   a	   century	  before	   being	   codified	   in	   the	   ‘76	   Act.	   	   It	   is	   plausibly	   seen	   as	   more	  incremental	   for	  this	  doctrine	  to	  have	  begun	  life	  as	  a	  defense,	  as	   it	  did	  in	  these	   cases,	   in	   as	   much	   as	   doing	   so	   does	   not	   entail	   a	   change	   in	   the	  
 to	  such	  use.”).	  43. See	   Dennis	   J.	   Sweeney,	  The	   Common	  Law	  Process:	   A	  New	  Look	   at	   an	  Ancient	   Value	  
Delivery	  System,	  79	  WASH.	  L.	  REV.	  251,	  268	  (2004).	  	  Rather,	   it	   is	   the	   common	   law	   process	   of	   making	   law	   by	   arriving	   at	   principled	  decisions	   in	   real	   cases,	   based	   not	   upon	   a	   single	   rule	   or	   statute,	   but	   upon	   a	   whole	  tradition	  of	   looking	  at	  and	  thinking	  about	   law	  and	   legal	  problems	  that	  both	  yields	  a	  decision	   and	   incrementally	   adds	   to	   the	   body	   of	   common	   law.	   	   The	   common	   law	  approach	   remains	   the	   single	   most	   effective	   mechanism	   for	   adapting	   the	   law	  incrementally	  to	  society's	  changing	  values.	  	  
Id.	   	   See	   also	   Shyamkrishna	   Balganesh,	   The	   Pragmatic	   Incrementalism	   of	   Common	   Law	  
Intellectual	  Property,	  63	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  1543,	  1545	  (2010).	  	  Additionally,	   the	   common	   law	   method	   that	   [courts]	   employ	   develops	   the	   law	  incrementally,	   recognizing	   the	   need	   for	   caution	   in	   a	   rapidly	   changing	   social	   and	  technological	   environment,	   and	   allowing	   future	   courts	   to	   extend,	   limit,	   or	   at	   times	  altogether	  deny	  protection	  when	  circumstance	  and	  context	  change.	  I	  call	  this	  method	  of	  adjudication	  and	  rule	  development	  “pragmatic	  incrementalism,”	  in	  that	  it	  exhibits	  the	  characteristics	  of	  both	  legal	  pragmatism	  and	  common	  law	  incrementalism.	  	  
Id.	   44. LYMAN	  RAY	  PATTERSON,	  COPYRIGHT:	   IN	  HISTORICAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  227	  (1968)	  (“And	  only	  the	  nebulous	  and	  uncertain	  doctrine	  of	  fair	  use,	  the	  idea	  that	  one	  may	  reproduce	  a	  small	  part	  of	  a	  copyrighted	  work	  for	  a	  limited	  purpose,	  protects	  the	  individual	  who	  wishes	  to	  extend	  his	  use	  of	  the	  work	  beyond	  the	  reading	  of	  it.”).	  45. Folsom	  v.	  Marsh,	  9	  F.	  Cas.	  342	  (Mass.	  1841)	  (No.	  4,901).	  46. Lawrence	  v.	  Dana,	  15	  F.	  Cas.	  26,	  58,	  61	  (C.C.D.	  Mass.	  1869)	  (No.	  8,136)	  (A	  date-­‐based	  search	  on	  WestlawNext	  for	  the	  term	  “fair	  use”	  returned	  Lawrence	  as	  the	  earliest	  case	  using	  the	  term	  of	  art	  in	  relation	  to	  copyright;	  this	  fact	  is	  also	  noted	  in	  Barton	  Beebe,	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  
U.S.	  Copyright	  Fair	  Use	  Opinions,	  1978–2005,	  156	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  549,	  560	  n.42	  (2008)	  (“The	  term	  of	  art	  apparently	  first	  appeared	  in	  reported	  federal	  case	  law	  in	  Lawrence	  v.	  Dana.”)).	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elements	   of	   the	   prima	   facie	   cause	   of	   action.	   	   This	   sort	   of	   small,	  incremental	   step	  may	  seem	  particularly	  appropriate	  given	   that	  early	  on	  fair	  use	  was	  a	  difficult	  test	  to	  satisfy,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  aptly	  characterized	  as	   a	   small	   exception	   to	   a	   general	   rule	   of	   strict	   liability.	   	   Indeed,	   some	  commentators	  have	  viewed	  Folsom	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  strengthening	  of	  owners’	  rights.47	  While	   copyright	   scholars	   are	   fond	   of	   noting	   that	   the	   modern	   four	  factors	   of	   the	   fair	   use	   test	   each	   bear	   its	   correlate	   in	   Justice	   Story’s	  landmark	   elucidation	   of	   the	   test	   in	   Folsom	   v.	   Marsh,48	   this	   superficial	  similarity	   hides	   a	   fundamentally	   more	   important	   dissimilarity,	   namely,	  that	   the	   scope	   of	   fair	   use	   has	   grown	   dramatically	   over	   time.49	   	   A	   few	  choice	  examples	  easily	  demonstrate	  this	  point.	  
 47. Lydia	  Pallas	  Loren,	  Redefining	  the	  Market	  Failure	  Approach	  to	  Fair	  Use	   in	  an	  Era	  of	  
Copyright	   Permission	   Systems,	   5	   J.	   INTELL.	   PROP.	   L.	   1,	   16	   (1997)	   (stating	   “Because	   the	   first	  Copyright	  Act	  in	  the	  United	  States	  gave	  a	  copyright	  owner	  only	  the	  right	  of	  ‘printing,	  reprinting,	  publishing	  and	  vending’	  the	  copyrighted	  work,	  the	  judicially	  created	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  actually	  created	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  rights	  given	  to	  the	  copyright	  owner.	  If	  the	  new	  work	  was	  found	  not	  to	  be	  a	  fair	  use,	  the	  copyright	  owner	  could	  prohibit	  its	  publication,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  verbatim	  printing	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  showing	  that	  a	  particular	  publication	   was	   not	   a	   ‘fair	   use,’	   the	   copyright	   owner	   could	   prohibit	   uses	   that	   were	   not	  otherwise	  within	  the	  grant	  of	  exclusive	  rights.”);	  Patterson,	  supra	  note	  44	  (stating	  “Given	  that	  a	  bona	   fide	   abridgment	   of	   a	   copyrighted	   work	   was	   not	   considered	   an	   infringement,	   [Justice]	  Story	  could	  not	  summarily	  hold	  that	  the	  defendant's	  use	  was	  piratical.	  Instead,	  he	  did	  the	  next	  best	   thing	  by	  narrowing	  the	  principles	  applicable	  to	  abridgment	  and	  making	  those	  principles	  applicable	  to	  a	  use	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  generally.	  He	  repeated	  in	  Folsom	  what	  he	  had	  said	  in	  Gray	  and,	  without	  acknowledging	  it,	  reinforced	  his	  earlier	  narrowing	  of	  the	  fair	  abridgment	  doctrine.	  The	   result	  of	   Story’s	  opinion	   in	  Folsom	  was	   to	  enlarge	  protection	   for	   the	   copyright	  owner.”).	  	  	  48. See	  LEAFFER,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  429	  n.10.	  49. See	  BEEBE,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  560,	  622	  (stating	  “The	  language	  of	  section	  107’s	  factors	  was	  largely	  drawn	  from	  Justice	  Joseph	  Story’s	  1841	  circuit	  court	  opinion	  in	  Folsom	  v.	  Marsh,	  an	  opinion	  whose	   influence	  on	  American	  fair	  use	  case	   law	  up	  to	  the	  1976	  Act	  we	  have	  probably	  overestimated,	  or	  so	  the	  data	  suggest,	  but	  whose	  influence	  since	  is	  quite	  clear.	  	  Where	  the	  non-­‐leading	  cases	  declined	  to	  follow	  the	  leading	  cases,	  they	  repeatedly—and	  systematically—did	  so	  in	  ways	   that	   expanded	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   fair	   use	   defense.”)	   	  But	   see	   Gideon	  Parchomovsky	  &	  Philip	  J.	  Weiser,	  Beyond	  Fair	  Use,	  96	  CORNELL	  L.	  REV.	  91,	  93–94	  (2010).	  	  The	  second	  problem	  plaguing	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  is	  that,	  sadly,	  the	  best	  of	  times	  are	  long	  gone.	  	  The	  golden	  era	  of	  fair	  use—if	  one	  ever	  existed—ended	  about	  a	  decade	  ago	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Digital	  Millennium	  Copyright	  Act	  (DMCA).	  	  This	  legislation	  prohibited	   users	   from	   circumventing	   technological	   protection	   measures	   (TPMs)	  employed	   by	   rights	   holders	   to	   control	   access	   to	   their	   works.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	  legislation	   famously	   banned	   the	   production	   and	   provision	   of	   circumvention	  technologies.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  two	  prohibitions	  changed	  the	  traditional	  balance	  between	  rights	  holders	  and	  users.	   	  As	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   legislative	  history,	  Congress	  made	   a	   conscious	   decision	   not	   to	   recognize	   fair	   use	   as	   a	   defense	   in	   circumvention	  cases.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  Congress	  significantly	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  fair	  use	  for	  copyrighted	  works	   in	  digital	  media;	  notably,	  Congress	  did	  not	  grant	  users	   fair	  use	  privileges	   for	  TPM-­‐protected	  content.	  	  	  
Id.	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In	  a	  few	  important	  recent	  cases,	  courts	  have	  upheld	  the	  functioning	  of	  search	   engines	   such	   as	   Arriba	   Soft’s	   image	   search	   engine	   and	   Google’s	  search	   engine,	   as	   fair	   uses.50	   	   This	   is	   true	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   their	  normal	   functioning,	   these	   search	   engines	   cause	   thousands	   or	   even	  millions	  of	  unauthorized	  copies	  to	  be	  made.51	   	  Google	  Books	  is	  a	  project	  that	   raises	   the	   level	   of	   unauthorized	   copying	   to	   world-­‐historic	  proportions.	  	  First,	  Google	  engaged	  in	  the	  digitization	  of	  15	  million	  books,	  an	  indeterminate,	  but	  clearly	  large	  number	  of	  which	  were	  still	  protected	  by	  copyright.52	   	  Next	  these	  books	  were	  copied	  onto	  Google’s	  proprietary	  servers	  and	  portions	  of	   these	  texts	  were	  displayed	  millions	  of	   times	  per	  day,	   pursuant	   to	   user	   search	   requests.	   	   A	   group	   of	   leading	   copyright	  scholars	   convened	   to	   discuss	   this	   issue	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   use	   of	  Google	   Books	  was	   fair	   use.53	   	   I	   will	   assume,	   for	   purposes	   of	   argument,	  
 50. Kelly	  v.	  Arriba	  Soft	  Corp.,	  336	  F.3d	  811,	  819–20	  (9th	  Cir.	  2003);	  Field	  v.	  Google	  Inc.,	  412	  F.	   Supp.	  2d	  1106,	  1118	   (D.	  Nev.	  2006)	   (“Based	  on	   the	  balancing	  of	   the	   relevant	   fair	  use	  factors,	   the	   Court	   finds	   that	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   Google	   itself	   copied	   or	   distributed	   Field’s	  copyrighted	  works	  by	  allowing	  access	  to	  them	  through	  ‘Cached’	  links,	  Google	  engaged	  in	  a	  ‘fair	  use’	  of	  those	  copyrighted	  works.”).	  51. Perfect	  10,	  Inc.	  v.	  Amazon,	  487	  F.3d	  701,	  713	  (9th	  Cir.	  2007).	  Some	   website	   publishers	   republish	   Perfect	   10’s	   images	   on	   the	   Internet	   without	  authorization.	  Once	   this	  occurs,	  Google’s	   search	  engine	  may	  automatically	   index	   the	  webpages	   containing	   these	   images	   and	   provide	   thumbnail	   versions	   of	   images	   in	  response	  to	  user	   inquiries.	   	  When	  a	  user	  clicks	  on	  the	  thumbnail	   image	  returned	  by	  Google’s	  search	  engine,	  the	  user’s	  browser	  accesses	  the	  third-­‐party	  webpage	  and	  in-­‐line	   links	   to	   the	   full-­‐sized	   infringing	   image	   stored	   on	   the	   website	   publisher’s	  computer.	   This	   image	   appears,	   in	   its	   original	   context,	   on	   the	   lower	   portion	   of	   the	  window	   on	   the	   user’s	   computer	   screen	   framed	   by	   information	   from	   Google’s	  webpage.	  	  	  
Id.;	  Perfect	  10	  v.	  Google,	  416	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  828,	  831	  (C.D.	  Cal.	  2006).	  52. Miguel	  Helft,	  Judge	  Rejects	  Google’s	  Deal	  to	  Digitize	  Books,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Mar.	  22,	  2011,	  at	  B1	   (“Google’s	   ambition	   to	   create	   the	  world’s	   largest	   digital	   library	   and	  bookstore	   has	   run	  into	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  300-­‐year-­‐old	  legal	  concept:	  copyright.”).	  53. See	  Pamela	  Samuelson,	  Google	  Book	  Search	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Books	  in	  Cyberspace,	  94	  MINN.	  L.	  REV.	  1308,	  1314,	  1374	  n.33	  (2010)	  (“In	  February	  2006,	  I	  hosted	  a	  workshop	  of	  about	  fifteen	  copyright	  professors	  to	  discuss	  Google’s	  fair	  use	  defense	  in	  the	  Authors	  Guild	  case.	  	  The	  general	   consensus	   at	   that	   meeting	   was	   that	   this	   fair	   use	   defense	   was	   likely	   to	   succeed.	  	  Scholarly	  commentary	  has	  generally	  been	  supportive	  of	  Google’s	   fair	  use	  defense.”).	   	  See	  also	  Hannibal	  Travis,	  Google	  Book	  Search	  and	  Fair	  Use:	  iTunes	  for	  Authors,	  or	  Napster	  for	  Books?,	  61	  U.	  MIAMI	  L.	  REV.	  87,	  91	  (2006).	  This	   Article	   maintains	   that	   the	   courts	   will	   best	   serve	   intellectual	   property	   and	  antitrust	   policy	   by	   concluding	   that	   Google	   is	   making	   fair	   and	   permissible	   uses	   of	  copyrighted	  works	  when	  it	  enhances	  the	  efficiency	  with	  which	  they	  are	  marketed	  and	  sold.	   	  The	  key	  fact	  for	  purposes	  of	  a	  fair	  use	  analysis,	  I	  will	  argue,	   is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence,	   and	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   there	   will	   ever	   be	   any	   evidence,	   that	   Google	   Book	  Search	  is	  causing	  a	  decline	  in	  sales	  of	  either	  printed	  books	  or	  e-­‐books.	  	  Indeed,	  if	  there	  were	  any	   justifiable	  criticism	  of	  Google	  Book	  Search,	   it	  would	  be	   that	  copyright	   law	  has	  unduly	  hampered	  its	  development	  and	  utility.	  	  	  
Id.	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that	   this	   distinguished	   group	   is	   right.	   	   The	   implication	   of	   making	   this	  assumption	   is	   that	   an	   extraordinary	   number	   of	   uses	   unauthorized	   by	  owners	  are	  fair	  uses.	  	  A	  third	  large	  category	  of	  fair	  uses	  is	  user-­‐generated	  content.	   	   I	   have	   argued	   elsewhere	   that	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   user-­‐generated	  content	   that	   incorporates	   elements	   of	   commercial	   works	   in	   an	   even,	  mildly	  transformative	  manner,	  will	  be	  considered	  fair	  use	  as	   long	  as	  the	  use	  is	  not	  commercial;	  there	  is	  no,	  or	  marginal,	  real	  harm;	  and	  not	  much	  is	   taken	   quantity-­‐wise.	   	   While	   these	   conditions	   may	   sound	   exacting,	   I	  argue	  that,	  in	  fact,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  user-­‐generated	  content	  fits	  the	  bill.54	  These	   instances	   together	  bear	  evidence	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   fair	  use	  now	  numbers	  in	  the	  millions	  per	  day.	  	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	   uses	   of	   these	   general	   sorts	   will	   continue	   to	   grow	   dramatically,	   as	  new	  business	  models	   that	   are	   functionally	   analogous	   to	   search	  engines,	  Google	  Books,	  and	  UGC-­‐aggregation	  sites	  are	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  emerge,	  given	  the	  apparent	  green	  light	  given	  by	  courts.	  As	  fair	  use	  becomes	  increasingly	  common,	  it	   is	   increasingly	  unfair	  to	  place	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   on	   defendants,	   as	   that	   rule	   unduly	   favors	  plaintiffs	  who	  are	   smaller	   in	  number	  and	  often	   large	   corporate	   entities,	  willing	   and	   able	   to	   pursue	   scorched-­‐earth	   legal	   strategies	   that	   put	  everyday	  users,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  realistic	  ability	  to	  defend	  themselves,	  at	  an	   unfair	   disadvantage.55	   	   As	   fair	   use	   becomes	   more	   common,	   the	  likelihood	   that	  a	  plaintiff’s	  being	  able	   to	   satisfy	   the	  elements	  of	   a	  prima	  
facie	  case	  of	  infringement	  will	  predict	  or	  correlate	  with	  an	  actual	  instance	  of	   infringement	   goes	   down.	   	   Under	   such	   general	   uncertainty	   and	   with	  
 	   My	  own	  view	  all	   along	  has	  been	   that	   this	   activity	   constituted	   infringement	   on	   a	   never-­‐before	   seen	   scale.	   	   Steven	   Hetcher,	   The	   Half-­‐Fairness	   of	   Google’s	   Plan	   to	   Make	   the	   World’s	  
Collection	  of	  Books	  Searchable,	  13	  MICH.	  TELECOMM.	  &	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  10	  (2006).	  54. Steven	  Hetcher,	  Using	  Social	  Norms	  to	  Regulate	  Fan	  Fiction	  and	  Remix	  Culture,	  157	  U.	  PA.	  L.	  REV.	  1869,	  1900–28	  (2009).	  55. Ned	  Snow,	  Proving	  Fair	  Use:	  Burden	  of	  Proof	  as	  Burden	  of	  Speech,	  31	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  1781,	  1806	  (2010).	  	  A	   copyright	   holder	   who	   pursues	   an	   individual	   fair	   user	   will	   nearly	   always	   be	  successful	   at	   achieving	   the	   desired	   silence.	   The	   burden	   of	   proof	   imposes	   a	   high	  financial	   cost	   on	   the	   fair	   user	   to	   gather	   evidence	   and	   persuade	   a	   fact-­‐finder	   of	   its	  correct	   interpretation.	   This	   cost	   becomes	   prohibitive	   as	   individual	   fair	   users	   often	  lack	  economic	  means	  to	  defend	  their	  speech.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  promised	  reward	  or	   financial	  backing	  for	   fair-­‐use	  speech,	   the	  costliness	  of	   the	  burden	  quickly	  drowns	  out	  protected	  speech.	  In	  short,	  individuals	  who	  blog	  for	  fun	  will	  not	  even	  contemplate	  a	  fair-­‐use	  fight	  given	  the	  expensive	  cost	  of	  prevailing.	  	  	  
Id.;	   Jessica	   Litman,	  Lawful	   Personal	   Use,	   85	   TEX.	   L.	   REV.	   1871,	   1873	   (2007)	   (“Fifty	   years	   ago,	  copyright	   law	  rarely	  concerned	   itself	  with	  uses	   that	  were	  not	  both	  commercial	  and	  public.”);	  Rebecca	  Tushnet,	  Copy	  This	  Essay:	  How	  Fair	  Use	  Doctrine	  Harms	  Free	  Speech	  and	  How	  Copying	  
Serves	   It,	  114	  YALE	  L.J.	  535,	  584	  (2004)	   (observing	   that	  copyright	  holders	  did	  not	   target	  past	  practices	  of	  innocuous	  copying,	  whereas	  now	  those	  copiers	  are	  becoming	  subject	  to	  suit,	  owing	  to	  online	  technology).	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large	  numbers	  of	  fair	  users,	  the	  burden	  should	  rest	  with	  the	  party	  seeking	  to	  assert	  the	  wrong	  of	  another.	  The	   placement	   of	   the	   burden	   goes	   philosophically	   deep.	   	   If	   one	  considers	  the	  preservation	  and	  promotion	  of	  liberty	  as	  a	  core	  virtue	  of	  a	  regulatory	  regime,	  this	  arguably	  implies	  that	  a	  defendant	  would	  have	  her	  liberty	  unduly	  constrained	  if	  she	  is	  required	  to	  take	  the	  first	  step	  to	  prove	  whether	  her	  use	   is	   fair.	   	  This	   is	   true	  seeing	  as	   this	  rule	   impinges	  on	  her	  liberty	   to	   copy,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  her	  act	  may	  very	  well	  be	  a	   fair	  use	  and	  thus,	  not	  an	  infringement.	  	  Switching	  the	  burden	  would	  count	  against	  plaintiffs’	   interests;	   yet	   between	   the	   two	   parties	   it	   is	   more	   legally	  appropriate	   to	   place	   this	   burden	   on	   plaintiffs.	   	   This	   situation	   is	   the	  private	   law	  equivalent	  of	   innocent	  until	  proven	  guilty,	  not	   civilly	  wrong	  until	  proven	  so.	  Apart	  from	  this	  basic	  fairness	  argument,	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  economic	  argument	   for	   shifting	   the	   burden	   as	   instances	   of	   fair	   use	   become	  more	  prevalent.	  	  The	  greater	  the	  percentage	  of	  instances	  of	  fair	  use,	  the	  greater	  the	   social	   costs.	   	  This	   subsequently	   increases	   the	  average	  percentage	  of	  defendants	   that	   have	   to	   be	   sued	   and	   defend	   themselves,	   rather	   than	  making	   it	   harder	   to	   bring	   suit	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   	   After	   all,	   having	   the	  burden	   of	   proof	   is	   a	   form	   of	   cost	   to	   the	   user.56	   	   Thus,	   on	   efficiency	  grounds,	   there	   is	   greater	   reason	   to	   shift	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   as	   the	  percentage	  of	  fair	  instances	  of	  use	  grows,	  reducing	  overall	  social	  costs.	  Despite	  the	  above	  arguments,	  in	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  inquiry	  we	  should	  be	   open	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   are,	   nevertheless,	   other	   arguments	   as	   to	  why	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  should	  be	  with	  defendants.	   	   I	  want	  to	  consider	  one	  possibility:	  the	  argument	  that	  defendants	  are	  better	  situated	  to	  bear	  the	   burden	   with	   regard	   to	   producing	   evidence.57	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  well-­‐known	   case	  Summers	   v.	   Tice,	   the	   court	   shifted	   the	  burden	  of	   proof	  regarding	   causation	   to	   the	   defendant.58	   	   In	   the	   doctrine	   of	   res	   ipsa	  
 56. Campbell	   v.	   Acuff-­‐Rose	  Music,	   Inc.,	  510	  U.S.	   569,	   590	   (1994)	   (“Since	   fair	   use	   is	   an	  affirmative	  defense,	  its	  proponent	  would	  have	  difficulty	  carrying	  the	  burden	  of	  demonstrating	  fair	  use	  without	  favorable	  evidence	  about	  relevant	  markets.”).	  57. M.B.W.	  Sinclair,	  Fair	  Use	  Old	  and	  New:	  The	  Betamax	  Case	  and	  its	  Forebears,	  33	  BUFF.	  L.	  REV.	  269,	  325–26	  (1984).	  Thus,	   fair	   use	   arises	   in	   litigation	   as	   an	   affirmative	   defense.	   	   Common	   sense	   and	  procedure	   permit	   no	   other	   stance.	   	   It	   would	   appear	   to	   follow	   that	   “[i]f	   fair	   use	   is	  viewed	  as	  a	  defense,	  or	  a	  form	  of	  excused	  infringement,	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  lies	  with	  the	  defendant.”	  	  But	  one	  should	  not	  reach	  hasty	  conclusions	  on	  mere	  appearances.	  	  As	  Congress	   noted,	   “any	   special	   statutory	   provision	   placing	   the	   burden	   of	   proving	   fair	  use	  on	  one	  side	  or	  other	  would	  be	  unfair	  and	  undesirable.”	  	  	  
Id.	   58. See	   Summers	   v.	   Tice,	   199	   P.2d	   1	   (Cal.	   1948)	   (shifting	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   to	   the	  defendants	  who	  needed	  to	  show	  which	  of	  them	  caused	  the	  harm);	  see	  also	  Byrne	  v.	  Boadle,	  159	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loquitur,	   courts	   shift	   the	   burden	   with	   respect	   to	   fault	   for	   evidentiary	  reasons.59	  	  These	  cases	  involve	  fact	  patterns	  in	  which	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  how	  the	  injury	  could	  have	  occurred	  absent	  negligence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  defendant.	  	  An	  analogous	  claim	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  hold	  true	  for	  copyright	  infringement	   generally,	   and	   yet	   the	   burden	   is	   generally	   shifted	   to	  defendants	  nevertheless.	   	  Courts	  do	  not	  simply	  find	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  such	  cases;	   instead	  courts	  shift	   the	  burden	  of	  proof	   to	  the	  defendant	  to	  show	  that	  she	  was	  not	  negligent.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  courts	  shift	  the	  burden	  due	  to	  an	  informational	  asymmetry	  between	  plaintiffs	  and	  defendants.	  In	   Ybarra	   v.	   Spangard,	   famously,	   the	   plaintiff	   was	   injured	   during	   a	  medical	  procedure	  while	  he	  was	  unconscious.60	   	  Due	   to	  his	  unconscious	  state,	   the	  plaintiff	  was	  not	   in	  a	  position	  to	  possess	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	   cause	   of	   the	   injury,	   while	   the	   defendants	   were	   especially	   well-­‐positioned	   in	   this	   regard,	   having	   been	   in	   the	   operating	   room	  when	   the	  injury	  occurred.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  court	  shifted	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  the	  defendants.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  when	  courts	  invoke	  
res	   ipsa	   loqitor,	   they	   continue	   to	   treat	   the	   case	   as	   involving	   a	   fault	  standard.	   	   For	   example,	   in	  Ybarra,	   the	   court	   did	   not	   shift	   away	   from	   a	  fault	  liability	  standard	  upon	  shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  fault	  standard	  is	  operative	  is	   logically	  distinct	  from	   the	   issue	  of	  who	  carries	   the	  burden	  of	  proof	  with	   respect	   to	   fault,	  that	   is,	   whether	   the	   burden	   on	   the	   plaintiff	   is	   to	   show	   fault	   or	   on	   the	  defendant	  to	  show	  lack	  of	  fault.	  The	  question	  of	  who	  is	  best	  suited	  to	  carry	  the	  burden	  regarding	  fault	  in	  a	  copyright	  infringement	  context	  came	  before	  a	  court	  in	  a	  recent	  case,	  
Lenz	  v.	  Universal.61	  	  While	  the	  specific	  issue	  arose	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  court’s	  
 Eng.	  Rep.	  299	  (1865).	  59. GOLDBERG,	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  210–11.	  
Res	  ipsa	  loquitur	  is	  an	  evidentiary	  doctrine	  applicable	  to	  certain	  tort	  causes	  of	  action,	  including	  negligence.	  	  When	  applicable	  in	  negligence	  actions,	  it	  permits	  a	  jury	  to	  infer	  that	   the	   plaintiff’s	   injury	   was	   caused	   by	   defendant’s	   carelessness	   even	   when	   the	  plaintiff	   presents	   no	   evidence	   of	   particular	   acts	   or	   omissions	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  defendant	  that	  might	  constitute	  carelessness.	  
Id.	  at	  210.	  	  Notice	  the	  effect	  of	  res	  ipsa,	  once	  successfully	  invoked:	  [R]es	  ipsa	  relieves	  the	  plaintiff	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  producing	  evidence	  as	  to	  what	  exactly	  the	   defendant	   did	   wrong.	   	   As	   Byrne	   notes	   .	   .	   .	   it	   is	   still	   open	   to	   the	   defendant	   to	  introduce	  evidence	  to	  rebut	  the	  inference	  of	  carelessness	  that	  res	  ipsa	  permits.	  	  In	  this	  way,	   res	   ipsa	   can	   be	   understood	   in	   part	   as	   an	   information-­‐forcing	   rule.	   	   It	   asks	   the	  party	  in	  the	  better	  position	  to	  identify	  what	  happened	  to	  come	  forth	  with	  evidence	  as	  to	  what	  really	  did	  happen.	  	  
Id.	  at	  211.	  	  60. Ybarra	  v.	  Spangard,	  154	  P.2d	  687,	  689	  (Cal.	  1945).	  61. Lenz	  v.	  Universal	  Music	  Corp.,	  572	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1150,	  1154	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  2008).	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interpretation	  of	   certain	   language	   in	   the	  DMCA	  Section	  512	   safe	  harbor	  provisions,	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  court	   treats	   the	   issue	  can	  plausibly	  be	   seen	   to	   give	   the	   decision	   broader	   import.	   	   The	   issue	   involved	   the	  interpretation	   of	   the	   statutory	   language	   that	   called	   for	   the	   plaintiff	   to	  have	  a	  good	  faith	  belief	  that	  there	  was	  an	  infringement	  when	  instigating	  a	  Notice	  of	  Takedown	  against	  an	  online	  service	  provider.62	  	  The	  defendant	  argued	   that	   the	   plaintiff	   could	   not	   have	   had	   such	   a	   belief,	   as	   the	  defendant’s	  use	  was	  clearly	  fair.63	  	  Plaintiff	  argued	  that	  the	  defendant	  was	  better	  suited	   to	  carry	   the	  burden	  as	   it	  was	  better	  placed	  with	  regard	   to	  the	   key	   facts	   relevant	   to	   fair	   use.64	   	   The	   court	   said	   little	   directly	   in	  response	   to	   plaintiff’s	   claim	   but	   rejected	   the	   argument	   by	   placing	   the	  burden	  with	   the	  plaintiff	   to	  allege	   lack	  of	   fair	  use.65	   	  Doing	  so	   implicitly	  states	  that	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  reason	  why	  the	  plaintiff	  cannot	  be	  made	  to	  carry	  this	  burden.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  court	  admonishes	  that,	  in	  the	  future,	  it	  will	  be	  inclined	  to	  view	  a	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  as	  “misrepresentation.”66	  A	  rejoinder	  might	  be	  to	  observe	  that	  the	  court’s	  analysis	  is	  restricted	  to	   the	   particular	   context	   of	   the	   DMCA’s	   provisions	   concerning	   the	  meaning	  of	  “authorized”	  by	   law.67	   	  There	   is	  an	  effective	  response	  to	  this	  
 62. Id.	  (“Thus	  the	  question	  in	  this	  case	  is	  whether	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  512(c)(3)(A)(v)	  requires	  a	  copyright	  owner	  to	  consider	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  in	  formulating	  a	  good	  faith	  belief	  that	  ‘use	  of	  the	  material	  in	  the	  manner	  complained	  of	  is	  not	  authorized	  by	  the	  copyright	  owner,	  its	  agent,	  or	   the	   law.’”);	   17	   U.S.C.	   §	  512(c)(3)(A)(v)	   (2006)	   Lexis,	   Current	   74	   (“A	   statement	   that	   the	  complaining	  party	  has	  a	  good	  faith	  belief	  that	  use	  of	  the	  material	  in	  the	  manner	  complained	  of	  is	  not	  authorized	  by	  the	  copyright	  owner,	  its	  agent,	  or	  the	  law.”).	  63. Lenz,	  572	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  at	  1152	  (“Lenz	  asserted	  that	  her	  video	  constituted	  fair	  use	  of	  ‘Let’s	  Go	  Crazy’	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  infringe	  Universal’s	  copyrights.”).	  64. Id.	  at	  1154.	  Universal	   contends	   that	   copyright	   owners	   cannot	   be	   required	   to	   evaluate	   the	  question	  of	  fair	  use	  prior	  to	  sending	  a	  takedown	  notice	  because	  fair	  use	  is	  merely	  an	  
excused	   infringement	   of	   a	   copyright	   rather	   than	   a	   use	   authorized	   by	   the	   copyright	  owner	   or	   by	   law.	   	   Universal	   emphasizes	   that	   Section	   512(c)(3)(A)	   does	   not	   even	  mention	  fair	  use,	  let	  alone	  require	  a	  good	  faith	  belief	  that	  a	  given	  use	  of	  copyrighted	  material	  is	  not	  fair	  use.	  	  Universal	  also	  contends	  that	  even	  if	  a	  copyright	  owner	  were	  required	   by	   the	   DMCA	   to	   evaluate	   fair	   use	   with	   respect	   to	   allegedly	   infringing	  material,	  any	  such	  duty	  would	  arise	  only	  after	  a	  copyright	  owner	  receives	  a	  counter-­‐notice	  and	  considers	  filing	  suit.	  	  	  
Id.	   65. Id.	   at	   1156	   (“A	   good	   faith	   consideration	   of	   whether	   a	   particular	   use	   is	   fair	   use	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  statute.”).	  66. See	   id.	   at	   1154–55	   (“An	   allegation	   that	   a	   copyright	   owner	   acted	   in	   bad	   faith	   by	  issuing	   a	   takedown	   notice	   without	   proper	   consideration	   of	   the	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   thus	   is	  sufficient	  to	  state	  a	  misrepresentation	  claim	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  512(f)	  of	  the	  DMCA.”).	  	  On	  the	  need	   for	   fair	  use	   safe	  harbors	  generally,	   see	  Gideon	  Parchomovsky	  &	  Kevin	  A.	  Goldman,	  Fair	  
Use	  Harbors,	  93	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  1483,	  1502–03	  (2007)	  (suggesting	  that	  because	  of	  over-­‐deterrence	  and	   uncertainty,	   fair	   use	   should	   be	   reformed	   to	   recognize	   certain	   types	   of	   copying	   as	  per	   se	  fair).	  67. See	  Lenz,	  572	  F.	  Supp.	  2d.	  at	  1154	  (“Whether	  fair	  use	  qualifies	  as	  a	  use	  ‘authorized	  by	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rejoinder;	  however,	  which	  is	  that,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  does	  not	  require	  that	  a	  defendant	  carry	  the	  burden	  with	  respect	  to	  fair	  use.68	  	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   status	   quo	   placement	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   is	   not	  grounded	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act,	  and	  is	  open	  to	  common	  lawmaking.	  	  It	  is	  a	  canon	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   common	   law	   and	   statutory	   law,	  that	  judges	  will	  feel	  freer	  to	  move	  the	  law	  when	  doing	  so	  does	  not	  require	  overtly	   contravening	   statutory	   text.69	   	   In	   addition,	   as	   noted	   earlier,	   the	  statutory	   history	   of	   Section	   107	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	   fair	   use	   should	  continue	  to	  evolve	  through	  its	  traditional	  common	  law	  roots.	  	  Shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  would	  indeed	  be	  an	  apparent	  step	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  and	  there	   is	  no	  reason	  that	  courts	  cannot	  mandate	  this	   shift	   by	   requiring	   plaintiffs	   to	   allege	   lack	   of	   fair	   use	   in	   their	  prima	  
facie	  case.70	  
 law’	  in	  connection	  with	  a	  takedown	  notice	  pursuant	  to	  the	  DMCA	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  issue	  of	  first	  impression.”).	  68. The	  language	  of	  Section	  501	  gives	  leeway	  for	  a	  court.	  	  It	  simply	  states,	  “Anyone	  who	  violates	  any	  of	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  of	  the	  copyright	  owner	  .	  .	  .	  is	  an	  infringer.”	  	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  501(a)	  (2006).	   	  Similarly,	  Section	  107	   is	  silent	  as	   to	  which	  party	  carries	   the	  burden.	   	  17	  U.S.C.	  §	  107	  (2006).	   	  See	  also	  Sony	  Corp.	  of	  Am.	  v.	  Universal	  City	  Studios,	   Inc.,	  464	  U.S.	  417,	  434,	  451–52,	  483–84	   (1984);	  Karen	  Bevill,	  Copyright	   Infringement	   and	  Access:	  Has	   the	  Access	   Requirement	  
Lost	   Its	   Probative	   Value?,	   52	   RUTGERS	   L.	   REV.	   311,	   336	   (1999–2000)	   (quoting	   Overman	   v.	  Loesser,	  205	  F.2d	  521	   (9th	  Cir.	  1953))	   (discussing	   the	   independent	   creation	  burden	  born	  by	  the	  defendant	  and	  the	  Copyright	  Act:	  “The	  general	  rule	  is	  that	  ‘[t]he	  burden	  of	  proof	  .	  .	  .	  remains	  on	  the	  plaintiff	  throughout	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  case,	  unless	  it	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  elsewhere	  by	  statute	  or	  practice.’	  	  Since	  the	  statute	  does	  not	  announce	  a	  burden-­‐shifting	  effect,	  if	  there	  is	  one,	  it	  must	  be	  established	  through	  practice.	  	  The	  practices	  in	  the	  circuits	  differ.”).	  69. Lisa	   A.	   Kloppenberg,	   Avoiding	   Serious	   Constitutional	   Doubts:	   The	   Supreme	   Court’s	  
Construction	  of	  Statutes	  Raising	  Free	  Speech	  Concerns,	  30	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  9–10.	  The	   “avoidance	   canon”	   is	   one	   of	   a	   large	   group	   of	   techniques	   used	   to	   avoid	  “unnecessary”	   constitutional	   questions,	   as	   explicitly	   set	   out	   in	   Justice	   Brandeis’s	  famous	   concurrence	   in	  Ashwander	   v.	   Tennessee	   Valley	   Authority.	   	   These	   techniques,	  constituting	  the	  “general	  avoidance	  doctrine,”	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  other	  doctrines	  of	  justiciability	  and	  jurisdictional	  limitations.	  	  	  
Id.	   70. Note	  that	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  proof,	  regarding	  damages,	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  contains	  specific	  doctrine,	  distinguishing	  willful	   infringement	  and	   innocent	  infringement.	   	  This	  distinction	  serves	  as	  a	  different	  basis	   for	  damages	  than	   is	   the	  case	   in	  tort	  generally,	  where	   damage	   awards	   turn	   on	   the	   distinctions	   between	   simple	   negligence	   versus	  some	  higher	   form	  of	   negligence	   such	   as	   reckless	   disregard,	   versus	   torts	   that	   are	   intentional.	  	  The	   Copyright	   Act,	   thus,	   is	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   general	   damages	   doctrine	   in	   copyright,	   as	  “innocent”	  infringers	  are	  liable,	  as	  the	  tripartite	  punctuated	  continuum	  of	  culpability	  found	  in	  tort	  generally	  has	  no	  “innocent”	  slot.	   	   It	   is	  evident	  that	  copyright	  has	  not	  taken	  tort	  seriously	  when	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  innocent	  infringement	  is	  found	  in	  copyright	  doctrine.	  	  Infringement	  is	  a	   tort	   and	   a	   tort	   is	   a	  wrong.	   	   A	  wrong	   cannot	   be	   innocent;	   that	  would	   be	   a	   contradiction	   of	  terms.	   	   Thus,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   tort	   generally,	   it	   is	   incoherent	   to	   talk	   about	   innocent	  infringement.	   	   Nevertheless,	   a	   court	   cannot	   simply	   disregard	   the	   distinctions	   related	   to	  damages	  drawn	  in	  the	  Act,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  following	  through	  on	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  fault	  standard.	   	  Hence,	  common	  law	  courts	  will	  not	   have	   the	   same	   freedom	   to	   change	   the	   damages	   rules	   so	   as	   to	   preclude	   damages	   for	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The	   fair	   use	   test	   is	   sometimes	   derided	   for	   being	   uncertain	   in	   its	  application	  and	  in	  its	  results.71	  	  An	  opponent	  of	  my	  position	  might	  argue	  that	   this	   vagueness	   ill	   suits	   fairness	   to	   serve	   as	   an	   element	   in	   the	  infringement	  cause	  of	  action.	  	  But	  when	  one	  sees	  that	  the	  same	  claims	  are	  made	   regarding	   the	   vagueness	   of	   the	   Hand	   Test	   and	   the	   Reasonable	  Person	   Standard	   in	   tort	   generally,	   one	   may	   reasonably	   conclude	   that	  vagueness	   of	   this	   sort	   comes	  with	   the	   territory	   for	   variants	   of	   the	   fault	  standard	   and	   is	   not	   dispositive	   concerning	   the	   determination	   of	   which	  party	   should	   carry	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   for	   establishing	   fault	   or	   lack	  thereof.72	  Moreover,	  fair	  use	  is	  plausibly	  seen	  as	  more	  uniformly	  applied	  across	  jurisdictions	  than	  is	  the	  case	  for	  fault	  in	  tort	  generally.	  	  All	  federal	  circuits	  apply	  the	  four-­‐factor	  test	  for	  infringement,	  with	  two	  of	  these	  factors	  each	  containing	  two	  sub-­‐factors.73	   	  By	  contrast,	   in	  tort	  generally,	  some	  courts	  apply	  a	  Reasonable	  Person	  Standard,	  the	  Hand	  Test,	  or	  appear	  to	  utilize	  a	  seemingly	  inchoate	  amalgam	  of	  the	  two.	  	  Plausibly,	  the	  greater	  degree	  of	  specificity	  and	  uniformity	  of	  the	  fair	  use	  test	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fair	  use	  test	  was	  codified	  in	  the	  ‘76	  Act.	  	  While	  codification	  is	  plausibly	  part	  of	  the	   explanation	   of	   the	   uniformity	   of	   the	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   across	  jurisdictions,	   it	   cannot	  be	   the	  whole	  story,	  because	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  has	   continued	   to	   evolve	   through	   case	   law	   in	   the	   many	   years	   since	   its	  codification.	   	   This	   is	   vividly	   seen	   by	   contrasting	   the	   fair	   use	   test	   as	  applied	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Sony	   v.	   Universal	   with	   how	   the	   Court	  applied	  the	  test	  years	  later	  in	  Campbell	  v.	  Acuff-­‐Rose.	  	  Significant	  changes	  
 innocent	   copiers,	   preclude	   statutory	   damages	   for	   negligent	   infringers,	   or	   for	   that	  matter,	   to	  preclude	  disproportionately	  large	  statutory	  damages	  for	  willful	  and	  unfair	  infringers.	  71. See,	   e.g.,	   Jessica	   Litman,	   Reforming	   Information	   Law	   in	   Copyright’s	   Image,	   22	   U.	  DAYTON	  L.	  REV.	  587,	  612–13	   (1996–97)	   (stating	   that	   the	  uncertainty	  of	   the	  application	  of	   the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  as	  a	  defense	  may	  result	  in	  a	  substantial	  chilling	  effect).	  72. Steven	   Hetcher,	   Non-­‐Utilitarian	   Negligence	   Norms	   and	   the	   Reasonable	   Person	  
Standard,	   54	   VAND.	   L.	   REV.	   863,	   864	   (2001)	   (“The	   reasonable	   person	   standard	   is	   an	   empty	  vessel	  that	  jurors	  fill	  with	  community	  norms.”);	  see	  also	  John	  Cirace,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Negligence	  and	  
Products	  Liability,	  66	  ST.	  JOHN’S	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  39	  (“But	  in	  the	  real	  world	  of	  uncertain	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  the	  Hand	  test.”).	  73. Pamela	  Samuelson,	  Unbundling	  Fair	  Uses,	  77	  FORDHAM	  L.	  REV.	  2537,	  2541–42	  (2009).	  [F]air	  use	  law	  is	  both	  more	  coherent	  and	  more	  predictable	  than	  many	  commentators	  have	   perceived	   once	   one	   recognizes	   that	   fair	   use	   cases	   tend	   to	   fall	   into	   common	  patterns,	   or	   what	   this	   Article	   will	   call	   policy-­‐relevant	   clusters.	   	   The	   policies	  underlying	   modern	   fair	   use	   law	   include	   promoting	   freedom	   of	   speech	   and	   of	  expression,	  the	  ongoing	  progress	  of	  authorship,	  learning,	  access	  to	  information,	  truth	  telling	   or	   truth	   seeking,	   competition,	   technological	   innovation,	   and	   privacy	   and	  autonomy	   interests	   of	   users.	   	   If	   one	   analyzes	   putative	   fair	   uses	   in	   light	   of	   cases	  previously	   decided	   in	   the	   same	   policy	   cluster,	   it	   is	   generally	   possible	   to	   predict	  whether	  a	  use	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  fair	  or	  unfair.	  	  	  
Id.	  
24	   MARQ.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	   [Vol.	  17:1	  
	  
in	   substantive	   doctrines	   of	   the	   sort	   seen	   in	   Campbell	   are	   the	   result	   of	  common	   law	   processes.	   74	   	   One	   of	   the	   features	   of	   common	   law,	   often	  referred	   to	   cited	   as	   a	   virtue,	   is	   its	   ability	   to	   adapt	   to	   changing	  circumstances	  in	  a	  morally	  nuanced	  manner	  as	  Congress	  recognized	  in	  its	  commentary	  on	  Section	  107.	  	  Allowing	  wider	  scope	  for	  this	  sort	  of	  moral	  nuance	  is	  particularly	  appropriate	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  equitable	  doctrine	  such	  as	  fair	  use.75	  Relatedly,	   Judge	   Posner	   argues	   that	   the	   legislative	   process	   is	   more	  subject	  to	  industry	  capture	  than	  is	  common	  law	  rulemaking.	  	  Along	  with	  his	   co-­‐author,	   he	   makes	   explicit	   the	   implication	   for	   copyright	   law:	   we	  should	  not	  expect	  statutes	  governing	  intellectual	  property	  to	  be	  efficient	  to	   the	   same	   degree	   as	   rules	   produced	   by	   courts.76	   	   This	   is	   yet	   another	  reason	   to	   think	   courts	   should	   be	   emboldened	   with	   respect	   to	   taking	   a	  proactive	  role	   in	  ensuring	   that	   the	   fair	  use	  doctrine	  continues	   to	  evolve	  by	  shifting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  plaintiffs.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  shifting	  the	  burden	  is	  practically	  feasible.	  	  In	   cases	   in	  which	   infringement	   is	   clear	   cut,	   the	   plaintiff	   will	   be	   able	   to	  simply	   allege	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   factors	   necessary	   for	   fair	   use:	   that	   the	  use	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  transformative	  if	  transformative	  at	  all,	  that	  what	  
 74. For	   instance,	   in	   Sony,	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   a	   commercial	   use	   was	   presumptively	  unfair,	  and	  that	  the	  fourth	  factor	  was	  the	  most	  important	  factor.	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  Campbell,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  the	  first	  factor	  was	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  and	  in	  addition	  did	  away	  with	  the	  presumptions	  from	  earlier	  cases.	  	  See	  Sony	  Corp.	  of	  Am.	  v.	  Universal	  City	  Studios,	  Inc.,	  464	  U.S.	   417,	   451	   (1984)	   (“[E]very	   commercial	   use	   of	   copyrighted	  material	   is	   presumptively	   an	  unfair	  exploitation	  of	  the	  monopoly	  privilege	  that	  belongs	  to	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  copyright.”).	  	  But	  
see	   Campbell	   v.	   Acuff-­‐Rose	   Music,	   Inc.,	   510	   U.S.	   569,	   578–85	   (1994)	   (“In	   giving	   virtually	  dispositive	  weight	  to	  the	  commercial	  nature	  of	  the	  parody,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  erred.”).	  75. See	  PATTERSON,	  supra	  note	  44,	  at	  220	  (1968)	  (“The	  problem	  of	  the	  author’s	  creative	  interest	  is	  a	  delicate	  subject	  which,	  by	  its	  very	  nature,	  can	  best	  be	  developed	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  method	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  for	  its	  development	  will	  require	  perceptive	  analysis	  and	   careful	   distinction.”).	   	   See	   also	   Craig	   Allen	   Nard,	   Legal	   Forms	   and	   the	   Common	   Law	   of	  
Patents,	  20	  B.U.	  L.	  REV.	  51,	  56–58	  (2010).	  The	  common	  law	  compares	  favorably	  to	  punctuated	  and,	  potentially	  more	  distortive,	  congressional	   action.	   	   The	   judge,	   in	   the	   Hayekian	   sense,	   is	   closer	   to	   the	   “inside	  baseball”	  dynamic	  that	  is	  unique	  to	  each	  of	  the	  divergent	  industries	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  patent	  system.	  	  Each	  industry	  has	  its	  own	  norms	  and	  customs,	  each	  relies	  on	  the	  patent	   system	   to	   varying	   degrees,	   and	   the	   common	   law	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   develop	  doctrine	  that	  reflects	  an	  industry's	  legitimate	  expectations.	   	  As	  Lon	  Fuller	  wrote,	  the	  common	   law	   “projects	   its	   roots	  more	  deeply	   and	   intimately	   into	  human	   interaction	  than	  does	   statutory	   law.”	   	   Relatedly,	   the	   common	   law	  demands	   that	   the	   judge	   look	  backward	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  individual	  fairness	  (namely,	  the	  parties	  before	  the	  court),	  but	   also	   requires	   a	   prospective	  mindset	   that	   is	   more	   inclusive	   in	   its	   deliberations.	  	  Moreover,	   judicial	  primacy	  acts	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  the	  more	  politicized	   legislative	  process	  or	  capture-­‐prone	  administrative	  rulemaking.	  	  
Id.	  	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  76. See	   WILLIAM	   M.	   LANDES	   AND	   RICHARD	   A.	   POSNER,	   THE	   POLITICAL	   ECONOMY	   OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  LAW	  25–26	  (The	  AEI	  Press,	  2004).	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was	  taken	  was	  creative	  or	  not	  published,	  that	  too	  much	  was	  taken,	  or	  that	  market	  harm	  has	  occurred	  or	  is	  occurring.77	  	  By	  contrast,	  with	  respect	  to	  fact	  patterns	  in	  which	  fair	  use	  is	  not	  so	  straightforward—is	  it	  not	  a	  good	  thing	  that	  plaintiffs	  are	  put	  to	  their	  proof?	  Shifting	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   has	   an	   important	   practical	   implication.	  	  An	  owner	  can	  no	  longer	  win	  an	  infringement	  lawsuit	  by	  default	  judgment.	  	  This	  holds	   true	  where	  a	  defendant	  cannot	  afford	   to	  dispute	  on	  a	  simple	  
prima	   facie	   showing	   of	   strict	   liability,	   as	   is	   now	   the	   case.	   	   Copyright	  scholars	   have	   often	   commented	   on	   the	   unfairness	   of	   the	   situation	   of	  losing,	   or	   potentially	   losing,	   by	   default.78	   	   Thus,	   the	   diminution	   of	  situations	   in	   which	   defendants	   might	   lose	   simply	   by	   default	   judgment	  after	  a	  showing	  of	  prima	   facie	   case	   for	   infringement	  presumably	  will	  be	  welcome	  to	  many.	   V.	  	  	   CONCLUSION	  Copyright	   case	   law	  has	  numerous	   instances	   in	  which	  appeals	   courts	  explicitly	   draw	   from	   common	   law	   principles	   as	   a	   source	   of	   law.	   	   My	  normative	   claim	   is	   that	   courts	   should	  do	   this	  with	   respect	   to	   copyright	  law,	  for	  fault	  principles	  in	  particular.	   	  First,	  courts	  should	  recognize	  that	  the	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   means	   that	   the	   operative	   liability	   standard	   in	  copyright	   law	   is	   not	   strict	   liability,	   but	   instead	   a	   type	   of	   fault	   standard.	  	  Second,	   courts	   should	   recognize	   that	   this	   legal	   finding	   has	   policy	  implications.	   	   As	   the	   above	   discussion	   indicated,	   when	   arguing	   from	   a	  general	  tort	  principle	  perspective,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  shift	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   of	   fault	   to	   plaintiffs	   in	   copyright	   infringement	  cases.	  	  Since,	  in	  tort	  generally,	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  with	  regard	  to	  fault	  lies	  with	   plaintiffs,	   the	   presumption	   should	   be	   that	   copyright	   infringement	  should	   have	   the	   same	   burden	   of	   proof	   unless	   a	   sufficient	   reason	   is	  provided	  otherwise.	   	  Such	  a	  reason	  appears	  to	  be	  lacking,	  or	  at	  any	  rate,	  in	  need	  of	  establishment.	  	  In	  light	  of	  these	  considerations,	  courts	  handling	  copyright	  cases	  should	  seek	  to	  change	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  with	  respect	  to	  fair	  use.	  	  They	  should	  do	  this	  both	  because	  it	  is	  the	  equitable	  thing	  to	  do	  in	  substantive	  legal	  terms,	  and	  because	  they	  are	  empowered	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  
 77. 17	  U.S.C.S.	  §	  107	  (2006	  Lexis,	  Current	  74).	  In	  determining	  whether	  the	  use	  made	  of	  a	  work	  in	  any	  particular	  case	  is	  a	  fair	  use	  the	  factors	   to	   be	   considered	   shall	   include—(1)	   the	   purpose	   and	   character	   of	   the	   use,	  including	  whether	  such	  use	  is	  of	  a	  commercial	  nature	  or	  is	  for	  nonprofit	  educational	  purposes;	  (2)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work;	  (3)	  the	  amount	  and	  substantiality	  of	  the	  portion	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  copyrighted	  work	  as	  a	  whole;	  and	  (4)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  use	  upon	  the	  potential	  market	  for	  or	  value	  of	  the	  copyrighted	  work.	  	  	  
Id.	   78. See	  Hetcher,	  supra	  note	  54,	  at	  1914–15.	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is	  the	  common	  law	  of	  tort	  that	  courts	  can,	  and	  do	  shift	  burdens	  of	  proof.	  As	   the	  above	  discussion	   indicated,	   it	   is	   relevant	  as	  well	   that	   shifting	  the	   burden	   regarding	   fair	   use	   is	   an	   aspect	   of	   fair	   use	   doctrine	   and	   so	  squarely	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  Congress’s	  intended	  scope	  of	  meaning	  for	  its	  stated	  desire	  not	  to	  freeze	  the	  fair	  use	  doctrine	  but	  instead	  let	  it	  continue	  to	  evolve.	   	  Typically,	  when	  the	  statutory	  text	  regarding	  the	  desire	  to	  not	  freeze	   fair	   use	   is	   evoked,	   it	   is	   done	   so	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   discussion	   of	  some	   doctrinal	   element	   within	   the	   four-­‐factor	   test.79	   	   But	   there	   is	   no	  reason	  that	  the	  Congressional	  invitation	  to	  innovate	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  this	   context.	   	   If	   innovation	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   fair	   use	   burden	   of	   proof	  would	  serve	   the	  goals	  of	   copyright,	   then	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	  assume	   that	  Congress’s	  invitation	  to	  common	  law	  innovation,	  with	  regard	  to	  fair	  use,	  would	  countenance	  this	  aspect	  of	  fair	  use	  as	  well.	  The	  discussion	   in	   the	  body	  of	   the	   text	   concluded	  by	  noting	   that	   this	  legal	  change	  provides	  an	   important	  practical	  benefit,	   that	  a	  plaintiff	  will	  not	  be	  able	   to	  win	  by	  default	  without	  having	  had	   to	  allege	  a	   lack	  of	   fair	  use	  and	  hence,	  an	   infringement.	   	  Unless	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	   is	  made,	   plaintiffs	  will	   continue	   to	   prevail	   by	   default	  without	   even	   having	  had	  to	  allege	  facts	  sufficient	  to	  rule	  out	  non-­‐infringement	  due	  to	  fair	  use	  and	  hence,	  authorized	  use.	  	  
 79. Perfect	   10,	   Inc.	   v.	   Amazon,	   Inc.,	   508	   F.3d	   1146,	   1166	   (9th	   Cir.	   2007)	   (specifically	  analyzing	   the	   “transformative”	   element	   of	   the	   first	   factor	   and	   noting	   “the	   importance	   of	  analyzing	  fair	  use	  flexibly”);	  Fisher	  v.	  Dees,	  794	  F.2d	  432,	  435	  (9th	  Cir.	  1986)	  (discussing	  the	  desire	   not	   to	   “freeze”	   the	   doctrine	   immediately	   before	   discussing	   the	   four	   factors);	   Triangle	  Publ’n,	   Inc.	  v.	  Knight-­‐Ridder	  Newspapers,	   Inc.,	  626	  F.2d	  1171,	  1174	  (5th	  Cir.	  1980)	   (same	  as	  
Fisher);	  SunTrust	  Bank	  v.	  Houghton	  Mifflin	  Co.,	  136	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1357,	  1371	  n.6	  (N.D.	  Ga.	  2001),	  
rev’d,	   268	   F.3d	   1257	   (11th	   Cir.	   2001)	   (noting	   the	   four-­‐factor	   list	   is	   not	   exhaustive	   and	   that	  courts	  have	  applied	  different	   tests	   to	   reach	  different	   conclusions);	  Lewis	  Galoob	  Toys,	   Inc.	   v.	  Nintendo	  of	  America,	   Inc.,	   780	  F.	   Supp.	   1283,	   1292	   (N.D.	   Cal.	   1991)	   (stating	   the	   four	   factors	  “are	   intended	   to	   guide	  but	   not	   to	   limit	   analysis”);	  DC	  Comics,	   Inc.	   v.	  Unlimited	  Monkey	  Bus.,	  Inc.,	  598	  F.	  Supp.110,	  119	  n.2	  (N.D.	  Ga.	  1984).	  
